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The Shape of Things

THE NEWS OF ALLIED BOMBS FALLING ON Japan, following closely on the extremely efficient raids on the Philippines, has had a tonic effect on the United Nations. For once their power has been shown to be actual and present rather than merely potential. And the mystery, so far undispelled, of where the raiders came from and where they landed seems to have created confusion in Tokyo. The contradictory Japanese broadcasts that have been coming in ever since are no doubt partly designed to elicit information; but they also indicate a surprise and consternation which are hardly consistent with the continuing Japanese statements that the damage was extremely slight and was confined, Allied deviltry being what it is, to "grammar schools, hospitals, and cultural establishments." The first reports spoke of sixty planes, of which nine were shot down. The latest stories say that there were ten American planes, and for the first time speak of three airplane carriers having been seen off the coast of Japan just before the raids. It is quite possible that the planes took off from carriers, bombed the four Japanese cities, and landed in China. Eventually no doubt, we shall have the whole story from Allied sources. Meanwhile our favorite Japanese comment on the raids is the one which described them as "just another Yankee joke and propaganda stunt for home consumption in America." The laughter in Tokyo strikes us as a little hysterical, but the chuckling in Chungking is entirely authentic.

*

APPOINTMENT OF GENERAL MACARTHUR to the newly established post of Commander-in-Chief in the Southwest Pacific, with instructions from the United Nations to "prepare to take the offensive against Japan," is an important milepost in the Pacific war. The forces under MacArthur have already seized the offensive to a considerable extent. The spectacular raid against the Philippines made by American bombers under the command of Brigadier General Ralph Royce appears to have done a good deal of damage to Japanese shipping, docks, and defense installations, and to have had a heartening effect on the American and Filipino defenders of Corregidor. Perhaps the most encouraging feature of the raid

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was the precision with which it was planned and carried out. The Japanese were not only taken completely by surprise but apparently are still uncertain about the location of the secret bases used. Nearer to their main base, American and Australian bombers have maintained constant offensive operations against the Japanese at Rabaul and at Kupang on the Dutch portion of Timor. The success of these attacks has greatly reduced the immediate danger of a Japanese drive against Australia. The initiative has passed to MacArthur, and there is every reason to believe he knows how to use it.

*

TWO OF THE COUNTRY'S LARGEST STEEL companies, Carnegie-Illinois and Jones and Laughlin, have been accused by the War Production Board of "repeated, deliberate violations of priority regulations." The charges are concrete and specific. The Jones and Laughlin Company is charged with making large quantities of tubing and drill pipe for the oil industry in direct violation of a WPB order and with distributing its products to civilian users having no preference rating whatever. Carnegie-Illinois is accused of publishing a manual for its employees setting up delivery schedules which ignored the government priority ratings. The seriousness of these charges can hardly be exaggerated. As a direct result of its resistance to the government's expansion plans of a year and a half ago, the steel industry has become one of the chief bottlenecks of the entire war-production program. If it is established that two of the principal steel producers have deliberately held up war production in order to fill orders for their civilian customers, the government would be amply justified in taking over plants belonging to these companies. J. L. Perry, president of Carnegie-Illinois, and H. E. Lewis, president of Jones and Laughlin, deny the WPB's accusations, but Mr. Lewis, in his denial, gives indirect support to the charge by admitting that more than 5 per cent of his company's shipments in March bore no priority rating. Yet all the steel companies have huge backlogs of unfilled, high-priority orders.

*

MUCH AS WE DETEST FATHER COUGHLIN and *Social Justice*, we prefer to see them both put out of circulation by full court proceedings rather than by Administrative action. On the basis of the magazine's recent contents those responsible for it appear no less open than Pelley to the charge of "making and distributing false statements intended to interfere with the success of the military and naval forces of the United States and intended to promote the success of our enemies." We therefore welcome Attorney General Biddle's announcement that *Social Justice*, its direction, ownership, and finance, is to be studied by the special federal grand jury now investigating Nazi propaganda and seditious influences. This will give Coughlin a chance to tell all, since he has now emerged from behind the camouflage provided by his parents, the nominal owners of *Social Justice*, and accepted full responsibility for the editorial policy of the magazine. By so doing he disavows his own positive declaration to Archbishop Mooney of Detroit that after May 27, 1940, he would not be in any way responsible for the publication. No doubt the grand jury will be interested in his explanation of this somersault. We hope, too, that the orator of Royal Oak will be asked why that old contributor to *Social Justice*—Dr. Goebbels—should have rushed so promptly to his defense. Our own explanation of this embarrassingly public acknowledgment of the Axis's indebtedness to Coughlin is that it constitutes recognition of the end of his usefulness in the United States. But some value can still be squeezed out of him by his presentation as a martyr to Roosevelt's "gangster methods" in broadcasts designed for Ireland and other Catholic countries.

*

ARCHIBALD MACLEISH, IN A SPEECH LAST week to the American Society of Newspaper Editors, pointed out that there are "minority elements of the American press which are actively influencing American opinion in directions which lead not to victory . . . but to defeat." It was not, he said, the responsibility of the government to crack down on such publishers, who contrive just to keep within the law. But, he suggested, it was the responsibility and duty of "the loyal and honest press to hunt out and expose by every instrument of truth the skulkers in the journalistic ambush." This emphatically is a job which the leading daily journals of the country, even those whole-heartedly supporting the war effort, are not doing. There was a time when newspapers did not hesitate to attack each other on issues of principle. Even as recently as the last war the New York *Tribune* waged a bitter campaign against "Coiled in the Flag, HEAR-S-S-S-T." But nowadays there seems to be a gentlemen's agreement in the publishing field that "dog doesn't eat dog." The New York *Herald Tribune* has, it is true, published at least one strong editorial criticism of the divisive press, naming names, but this is an honorable exception. And even the *Herald Tribune* refused to print an impressive full-page advertisement issued by the Friends of Democracy which castigates the behavior of Hearst, McCormick, and Patterson, asking them, "And what do you call 'aiding the enemy,' Gentlemen?" The New York *Times* applied a similar censorship, but the advertisement has appeared in the San Francisco *Chronicle*, which deserves praise for its patriotism. We hope other great newspapers will now reconsider their attitude. Their readers have a right to know which forces are undermining our war effort and what reputable and representative organizations think about their policy.

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THE REPORT ON THE NORMANDIE DISASTER is a shocking commentary on the lack of coordination and effective organization in the navy. At the time of the fire at least sixteen federal, state, and local government agencies were exercising some jurisdiction over the ship; but no individual or agency had real authority. The commandant had never been on board the Normandie and "did not consider himself in charge of the situation or to be the responsible naval officer present. He had considered the ship to be in charge of the district material officer and the fire to be in charge of the Fire Department." But the district material officer believed himself to be acting solely in an advisory capacity. The lieutenant in charge of the Coast Guard unit looked to orders from the captain of the port. The captain of the port "considered the commandant in command." The effect of this division in responsibility can also be seen in the inadequate precautions that were taken against fire or sabotage. The Coast Guard was supposedly responsible for the protection of the ship. But the Coast Guard fire watch had not been told that the city fire-alarm box had been removed. The hose lines first brought to the scene could not be connected because the Coast Guard had not been informed of the change from French to American fixtures. Essentially the faults were the same as those revealed in the Pearl Harbor investigation; only in this case the lack of coordination was even more flagrant. We have no easy solution to offer. The root of the difficulty may be found in the peace-time bureaucracy still controlling the armed forces. A rigorous overhauling is obviously called for.

✶

BY ANOTHER VOTE OF EIGHT TO FOUR, WITH the representatives of the public and labor lined up against the employer representatives, the National War Labor Board has ordered the International Harvester Company to accept a maintenance-of-membership provision in its union contract if a majority of union members in each of eight plants favor such a provision in a secret referendum. At a press conference William H. Davis, chairman of the board, stated that if any union member desired to drop out of the union before the referendum was held he could do so subject to the union constitutions. Roger D. Lapham, who wrote the dissenting opinion for the employers, said that the majority decision meant that a minority of 1,400 in a plant of 3,000 workers would be bound to remain in the union, even if they opposed the provision, assuming that 1,600 favored it. If, as Mr. Davis asserts, those who do not wish to remain in the union may drop out before the elections, the employers' concern lest workers be imprisoned in unions seems over great. As for the flaming assertion of the National Association of Manufacturers that maintenance of membership is only a sweeter name for the closed shop and that it amounts to a dictatorship over the American worker, we may be forgiven for suspecting that the N. A. M. is motivated by something besides devotion to workers' rights. The N. A. M. knows the difference—and it is enormous—between the closed shop and maintenance of membership; but the N. A. M. is not interested in being fair to organized labor, only in smashing it.

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THE MEXICAN GOVERNMENT'S POSITION IN the four-year controversy over the value of the oil wells expropriated by the Cárdenas regime has been substantially upheld in the award handed down last week. The value of the properties was set at $23,995,991. It is, to be sure, a good deal higher than the Mexican valuation of $9,000,000, but the companies had demanded $200,000,000. And it is clear that the United States has agreed to Mexico's contention that the subsoil rights did not belong to the American companies but to the people of Mexico. The agreement is a sound one and should contribute materially to the strengthening of military and political cooperation between the two countries.

✶

TWENTY MEMBERS OF THE SPANISH Falange, notorious for its pro-Axis activities throughout Latin America, have recently been granted American citizenship in Puerto Rico. Nearly all of the twenty are wealthy Spaniards; many of them are owners of large estates in Spain. Most, if not all, of them belong to the reactionary Casa de España in San Juan, headquarters of the Falange on the island. Many of them contributed large sums of money to Franco during the Spanish Civil War and are still contributing to the Auxilio Social, the Falange aid organization. In granting citizenship to this group United States District Judge Robert A. Cooper declared that he was "sure that he could not find cause why the applicants should not be granted the privilege of American citizenship," adding that he had "no doubt they would become loyal American citizens." Ironically enough, it was Judge Cooper who several years ago sentenced Dr. Albizu Campos and a group of other Puerto Rican nationalists to prison. Since Campos has come to symbolize the democratic aspirations of a considerable portion of the Puerto Rican population and the wealthy Falangists symbolize the most reactionary, anti-democratic influences on the island, Judge Cooper's action has proved anything but popular in Puerto Rico. No investigation appears to have been made to discover why this influential group of Falangists should choose this moment to seek the protection of American citizenship. In the Philippines members of the Falange actively aided the Japanese, for which they were honored with a special decoration by the Spanish Falange in Madrid. Possibly the FBI can find out what they are up to in Puerto Rico.

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G.O.P. Looks Abroad

BY DILIGENT prodding, Wendell Willkie has forced the old Republican elephant to unwrap its ears from in front of its eyes and take a look around the world. As a result, it has lumberingly climbed off the fence where it has been sitting so long and so inelegantly, and parked itself definitely on the anti-isolationist side. Reestablished in his position as mahout, Mr. Willkie now has to get his mount actually moving in a forward direction.

This outcome of the Republican National Committee meeting in Chicago is all the more interesting because many political observers had thought that Mr. Willkie's influence was waning in the higher councils of the party and had expected that the resolution he offered for consideration would be quietly smothered. The isolationists in the party were cock-a-hoop over the Illinois primaries, from which Senator C. Wayland Brooks and Representative Stephen Day had emerged with triumphant majorities. Among the party tacticians there seemed to be a feeling that it would be worth while not to alienate the isolationist and anti-war vote, which, added to that of the regulars, might be sufficient to swing the fall elections. In the committee itself Willkie's pledged supporters were supposed to constitute only a small minority, and when, against their protests, all resolutions were referred to a small subcommittee, a thinly diluted compromise motion seemed almost inevitable.

The two principal resolutions under consideration were those drafted by Mr. Willkie and by Senator Taft. Both included a declaration of full support to the President in the prosecution of the war, but the terms of Willkie's resolution were wider in scope and far more full-blooded than those that contented the Senator. The former Presidential candidate wished to put his party on record in favor of a war waged without reservations and against any peace with the enemy except "peace with victory." This part of his resolution emerged from the subcommittee virtually intact. It can be regarded as a definite blow to any appeasement forces which linger within the Republican ranks.

The most important and boldest part of Mr. Willkie's resolution was that which attempted to establish basic principles for American policy after the war. He sought to commit his party "to undertake now and in the future whatever just and reasonable international responsibilities may be demanded in a modern world." This advance rejection of watertight nationalism in relation to America's role in peace and reconstruction was of course a direct blow at the isolationists, who, if they have lost out on the war, hope still to win the peace with the brilliant success that the Republicans achieved in 1920. Moreover, it is a square hit on the principle of high protection which has been the outstanding article of Republican faith for over sixty years.

Under the circumstances it is more surprising that the essential meat of Mr. Willkie's resolution should have survived the culinary efforts of the subcommittee than that in the process it should have become somewhat less "rare." In the form in which it was unanimously adopted by the full National Committee the phrase "international responsibilities" disappeared, to be replaced by the statement: "We realize that after this war the responsibility of the nation will not be circumscribed within the territorial limits of the United States; that our nation has an obligation to assist in bringing about understanding, comity, and cooperation among the nations of the world."

Asked for comment, Senator Taft declared that "it was a great mistake for the National Committee to express any policy at all at this time on post-war action" but indicated also that he thought "the teeth of the Willkie proposal" had been drawn. Be that as it may, the passage of the resolution seems to us a clear indication that Mr. Willkie retains more influence than the Old Guard had supposed or hoped. His leadership has been given a new lease of life under conditions which suggest that his hold on the party will grow stronger in direct proportion to the extent to which he refuses to conform to the rigid and conventional pattern of Republicanism.

The Guthrie Case

THE Guthrie hearings before the Truman committee proved a disappointment. Enough evidence came out to indicate that Donald M. Nelson is still permitting entirely too much "business as usual" in the consumers'-durable-goods section of the War Production Board; it is on curtailment of these consumers' durables that we must chiefly rely for rapid expansion in war output. But this evidence often seemed to come out in spite of the Truman committee rather than through its efforts. The committee members spent too much time scraping and bowing before the dollar-a-year men and explaining that they were forced to ask embarrassing questions because Nelson had asked them to investigate the Guthrie case. The committee is understandably friendly to Nelson, but this friendship may get in the way of a forthright verdict in the case. For if the committee finds Guthrie's charges justified, it must criticize Nelson for having failed to give him a hearing and for permitting the conditions against which Guthrie protested. So far the committee's investigation of this case, in contrast to its usual public-spirited and courageous work, is noteworthy chiefly for its omissions. The record affords but a glimpse of the typewriter industry, which is making a half-million machines this year although it is one of

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the easiest to convert and is well adapted to make machine-guns. Little more has been done by the committee to probe into the scandalous delays in bringing full conversion of the construction industry to war purposes. The whole question of why dollar-a-year men are still permitted to make decisions affecting their own industries has been easily evaded by witnesses and inadequately pressed by the committee.

The fact is that from January 15, when Philip Reed of General Electric took over the Bureau of Industry Branches, until March 16, after Guthrie had resigned, curtailment orders had been issued in only six industries. The criticism which attended the Guthrie resignation seems to have stimulated the issuance of the forty orders that followed. In too many cases these orders were framed to suit the exigencies of industry rather than the needs of the emergency. A refrigerator manufacturer framed the order on refrigerators. A furniture manufacturer framed the order on furniture. Typewriter dollar-a-year men in the Army-Navy Munitions Board, as well as in the WPB, fought for, and succeeded in getting, continued production of typewriters. In this last case the supply services of War and Navy seem to have asked for more typewriters, while the ordnance and infantry sought immediate conversion of the industry to gun-making. The Truman committee could redeem itself and perform a public service by digging into the matter and giving us the details.

Laval Takes Over

BY FREDA KIRCHWEY

THOSE of us who have insisted, since the fall of France, that Pétain was a temporary Nazi expedient rather than an obstacle to Nazi aims must beware of taking too easy satisfaction in his downfall and in the imminent necessary end of American appeasement. It is true that much good may result from a clarification of Vichy's role. It is good that the United States government is being forced at last to abandon the pretense that it, not Hitler, was handling the strings attached to the puppet. It is good that our attempt to persuade the French people of our friendship while we snubbed their leaders and bribed and cozened their betrayers has at last collapsed; the end of equivocation is at least in sight.

But we should recognize that we have again been led to the point of action by our enemies, not by our own will. The accession of Laval to power was a minor Pearl Harbor; he burst in our faces like a bomb from a Japanese plane. Only a few weeks ago our Acting Secretary of State was publicly congratulating himself and the country on the latest eager assurances from Vichy that they were not going to yield an added inch to Hitler: the armistice terms were their final line of defense and there they would stand. But on the very day when the State Department's optimistic communiqué was issued, Pétain and Laval met at Randan near Vichy and undoubtedly laid the groundwork for the present deal. (Remember Kurusu?)

Now Mr. Welles is surprised and angry—as Chamberlain was after Prague, as Hull was after Pearl Harbor. The Vichy note rejecting our last note explaining our decision to send a consul to Brazzaville was a curt and nasty affair. It was drafted and released before Laval came to power. Just before. Then it was recalled and then again released, presumably by Laval's orders. If this note is an indication of the line of the new government, then a break is likely. On the other hand, several dispatches indicate that Laval is going to try for continued good relations with the United States. If he does, we may look for further moves aimed at stilling American apprehensions, such as Laval's unctuous deference to Pétain's painful indorsement of Laval. Then what will the State Department do? Is it not possible, in the light of the recent past, that our policy-makers may dream new dreams of dividing Laval from Pétain and of encouraging Darlan—the new Weygand—to pursue an independent course in regard to the fleet? After all, reputations have been staked on the success of appeasement; and it is hard to admit failure, even if you do it in the form of a statement claiming victory.

Hitler has again robbed us of the initiative. It is a simple fact, no paradox, that the strategic time to break with Vichy was before the Nazi trap was sprung. Then our act would have meant something. The noose around old Pétain's neck was visible for all to see, but still there remained confusion, doubt, a desperate craving on the part of the French people for a sense of solidarity with their democratic allies and a need almost as great on the part of the American people for a clean democratic line to follow and fight for. Before Laval, *we* could have taken the initiative.

We can still, to a limited extent, take matters in our hands, if for once we show ourselves capable of acting coldly and shrewdly and in accordance with our own interests—which are the contrary of the interests of Berlin. But to do that, we shall have to reverse our customary procedure, interpreting Laval's first smile as a deliberate provocation, a sufficient reason for ending relations. Whereas if Laval takes a truculent, defiant line, we shall be justified in assuming that Hitler is ready for a break but hopes to spare Laval the onus of actually making it. We will pursue our necessary objectives relentlessly, in full collaboration with the Free French and in open, undisguised opposition to Laval, but leave it to Laval to make the break that will put the final touch on his stupendous unpopularity. We still have a little space in which to maneuver, though we have lost the chance to

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act boldly in support of the cause to which we have pledged our collective life and fortune.

Within this space there are a good many things we can do. Hitler's decision to thrust Laval on the French people is a sign that he must at all hazards close his ranks in the West. The appointment of Field Marshal Karl von Rundstedt to supervise German defenses from the North Cape to Hendaye and the reported transfer of some additional 150,000 German troops to France show Hitler's concern over the growing threat of a second front. The "neutrality" of the old Vichy government is no longer sufficient protection; it must be sacrificed to the more urgent necessity of repression and full collaboration. Laval, the master wire-puller, will doubtless attempt to hand over his country with a minimum of disturbance; but if the victim struggles he will not hesitate to shoot. Pétain, it is already clear, will give his blessing to the proceedings. The least the United States can do is to refuse to cloak the dark business in its official good-will no matter how politely the Vichy gunmen may ask for it.

Our obvious battle task is to rob Hitler of the security he is gambling so much to win. We can do this only by acting promptly and in close collaboration with our allies. We can of course cut off finally all shipments to France and North Africa. We can back De Gaulle in every theater of action. It may already be too late to take Dakar without fighting the Germans; several dispatches report that Nazi submarines operating along the Atlantic merchant routes are based there. But many strategic points, especially including Martinique and Guadeloupe and the big island base of Madagascar lying across our route to the Middle East, should be promptly occupied by the Free French with Allied help. And the United Nations should take over and put into service the French warships still held in their ports.

We should push with all possible speed for an early Allied offensive in the West. Mr. del Vayo stresses, on another page of this issue, the desperate need of creating a second front while the first front still holds. He balances the enormous risks of an invasion of the Continent against the all-but-final disaster of a Russian collapse and urges the first as the lesser danger. Laval's coup and the mounting anger of the French people are a warning that we cannot afford to delay long. To accept the one and betray the other would assure Hitler his second conquest of the West.

Finally we should beat Hitler to at least one diplomatic punch by ending our relations *now* with Spain. Must the fiasco of Vichy be repeated in Madrid? Are we to go on fooling with Franco until the day arrives when Hitler decides to push his armies through without asking our permission or that of Britain? Let us for once act first, demanding that Franco order all Nazi technicians and army officers to leave Spain, that he force Nazi submarines and other craft to withdraw from Spanish ports, that he call back his Phalangists from the Americas, where they act openly as Hitler's agents, on pain, if he refuses—as indeed he must since he has no power either to order or to force—of immediate severing of diplomatic relations.

Our best answer to Hitler's latest move in France would be to wipe out the fiction of neutrality that still protects him in Spian.

More Dangerous than Nudism

BY I. F. STONE

Washington, April 19

COWARDLY is the only word I can find to apply to the conduct of Milo Perkins, director of the Board of Economic Warfare, in the cases of C. Hartley Grattan and Maurice Parmelee. A favorable press greeted the Vice-President's defense of these men against the usual reckless Dies committee charges. They have been cleared by the FBI. Yet Grattan was called in by Perkins and given the choice of resigning or being fired, and Parmelee was informed at 3:30 on Wednesday that he was being dismissed as of 5:30 that same afternoon. Grattan's past isolationist views in no way detracted from his usefulness to the board; he was employed as an expert on Australia, a field in which his competence is acknowledged. Parmelee's work with the United States War Trades Board in London during the last war, when he took part in the administration of the blockade, and his years of experience as an economist-consul in Berlin after the war made him unusually well qualified for service with the Board of Economic Warfare. His peremptory dismissal on two hours' notice was shameful. Dies can point to the removal of Grattan and Parmelee, as he already has to the resignation of Malcolm Cowley (under fierce attack and lukewarm support), as victories. Members of Congress who have gone to considerable risk to fight the Texan feel definitely let down by New Dealers who think the way to win a battle is to retreat under fire.

By contrast, neither the Standard Oil revelations before the Truman committee two weeks ago nor the

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General Electric and du Pont exposures before the Senate Patents Committee last week have led to any purge of their ubiquitous and powerful dollar-a-year men. The story of Remington Arms and tetracene was buried in the back pages of most newspapers. The testimony of Lawrence Dobey, special assistant to the Attorney General, shows that Remington Arms placed loyalty to its cartel partner, I. G. Farben, above loyalty to our country and our allies. Use of tetracene, a superior non-corrosive combustion initiator for machine-gun and rifle ammunition, was denied to countries of the British Empire last year because of Remington's obligations under a cartel agreement with I. G. Farben, though the patent is American-owned. The picture has its complexities. The anti-British clause of the agreement seems to have been originally inserted at the request of Britain's Imperial Chemicals, Ltd., which was as interested as Remington and I. G. in preventing competition. Du Pont, which controls Remington, also had, may still have, large stockholdings in I. G. Farben. Testimony revealed that not until November 20, 1940, did the executive committee of du Pont authorize the sale of its stock in I. G. Whether anyone came forward to buy German securities at the end of 1940 is not disclosed by the record. These entanglements illustrate the extent to which the basic war materials of the Western peoples, on which their destiny depends, are in the hands of concerns with a stake in both sides, concerns which regard the war as an unfortunate interruption in cartel relations they have every intention of resuming. Yet men drawn from these same companies continue to occupy strategic positions on the War Production Board and in the War and Navy departments. Behind them is intrenched wealth and a subservient press, and the New Deal is afraid to act against them. The tetracene revelations we owe to the public spirit and courage of Senators Bone, O'Mahoney, La Follette, and D. Worth Clark, for the power of the du Ponts has been great enough to keep the facts hidden in the files of the Department of Justice until now, and the War Department has been able to prevent the anti-trust division from prosecuting.

Postponing enforcement of the anti-trust laws until after the war is over is one way of lengthening, if not losing, the war. Take the case of tungsten carbide, also spread on the record of the Senate patents hearing last week. Tungsten carbide, next to the diamond and possibly boron carbide, is the hardest substance known and the best material yet discovered for the cutting edges of machine-cutting tools and wire-drawing dies. A *Fortune* article last January attributed the speed of German rearmament in large part to the widespread use of tungsten carbide in the Reich's industries. "In many machining operations," *Fortune* said, "substitution of tungsten carbide for high-speed steel multiplies the rate of production at least 500 per cent." Had it not been for an anti-trust investigation, the existence of a cartel agreement between General Electric and Krupp restricting the output of tungsten carbide in this country would never have come to light. Early in 1940 the Frankfort Arsenal invited bids on 3,000 pieces of tungsten carbide. L. Gerald Firth, of the Firth-Sterling Steel Company, a patent licensee of General Electric, bid $8,730, then wrote the government that he was forced to make this bid by the terms of his patent license, that he could have made a reasonable profit at $3,375. Investigation disturbed executives busy on war orders, but it also led to an indictment which was followed by a sharp reduction in the price of tungsten carbide.

In this case, as in so many others, restriction of production in this country was not forced upon American concerns but was sought by them. The agreement had its origin in the desire of General Electric to make Krupp stop selling tungsten carbide in this country. Through American outlets Krupp was selling tungsten carbide here at $50 a pound in 1927 and 1928. By its first agreement with Krupp in 1928 General Electric pushed the price up to $453 a pound, forced competitors out of business, and finally in 1936 bought Krupp out of the American market. A director of Krupp's, writing to G. E. in 1936, wondered why the output of tungsten carbide "was booming in Germany" but was so little used in this country, "although America was generally known for its ability to grasp and develop the most modern manufacturing methods." Engineers within General Electric's own organization protested in written reports against what they considered an uneconomic price policy and asked for the dissolution of the Carboloy Company, the G. E. subsidiary in charge of tungsten carbide. General Electric preferred the restrictive policy; so did its British cartel partner. Evidence given before the Senate committee showed that the British reached a restrictive agreement with the Germans a month after Britain and Germany were at war. G. E.'s agreement with Krupp has merely been suspended, not ended, by the war. In this as in most cartel agreements royalty reports gave the Germans useful military information.

I want to add a missing link in this story. John Henry Lewin, the Special Assistant Attorney General in charge of the tungsten-carbide case, testified that efforts were made to bring it to trial in the summer of 1941. The trial date was set for October, 1941. "Representations were made by counsel for the defendants," Lewin said, "that by reason of their engagements in connection with producing tungsten carbide, and in connection with the engagement of one of the individual defendants with the Office of Production Management, it was necessary to have postponement." The government objected, but the case was postponed to February, 1942, then to March, and is now set for trial on June 15. The dollar-a-year defendant

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whose time might be wasted by the trial is Dr. Zay Jeffries. Dr. Jeffries has been in Washington since February, 1941, as chairman of the metals' conservation and substitution group of the Advisory Committee on Metals and Minerals of the National Academy of Sciences, and is a War Production Board consultant on metals. Despite his supposed absence from work Dr. Jeffries was paid $15,500 in salary and $12,600 in bonuses by General Electric in 1941, in his dual capacity as technical director of G. E.'s lamp department (defendant in another anti-trust action) and chairman of the board of Carboloy.

As chairman of the board of Carboloy, Dr. Jeffries was in a position to know that its basic patents on tungsten carbide were declared invalid by the courts about two years ago and could be taken over by the government at any time. I doubt whether he ever so far forgot his private loyalties as to make this part of his advice as a government consultant. I do know of another case overlooked by both the Truman committee and the patents committee which gives some indication of the advice he offers. Last year the Truman committee heard of the run-around given to a man named Gaudy who held a patent for making aluminum from common clay, a method successfully used in Germany and Italy. Thurman Arnold testified last week that several years ago Alcoa bought up a patent of this kind for a million dollars and never used the process in production. Alcoa's monopoly is based on its possession of all the high-grade bauxite in the Western Hemisphere. Its monopoly would be undermined by a method for making aluminum from clay. The Truman committee last year heard that a Dr. Zay Jeffries at the National Academy of Sciences had made a report on this subject but never followed the lead any farther. Inquiry by this correspondent reveals (1) that though Dr. Jeffries has been working for General Electric since 1914, he also worked for the Aluminum Company of America from 1916 to 1936; and (2) that Dr. Jeffries submitted an unfavorable report on the Gaudy patent, although Bureau of Mines experts were for it and TVA had been using a similar patent successfully. This is the dollar-a-year man in the tungsten-carbide case whose time must not be taken up with embarrassing anti-trust questions.

1942 or Never

BY J. ALVAREZ DEL VAYO

MUCH has been said about the second front in recent months, and much more will be said in the months to come. The subject stirs all those who understand that this war is not a game, who look for some way out of the anguish of wanting the war to be won and not knowing how to win it. The people feel the force and logic of the growing demand for a second front while Russia's armies retain their fighting strength. Of course everyone has admired the spirit of the R. A. F. in bombing incessantly the German industrial centers at the moment when the Nazi armies seemed to be marching without halt toward the heart of Russia. In our desire to see the Allies undertake some action that would indicate the flowering of a more aggressive spirit, we all responded with enthusiasm every time a suicide patrol broke the siesta of the occupation forces in Norway or on the coast of France. And our feelings were justified. All that was heroic, useful, encouraging. But it was not enough. Even night bombing on a mass scale, from which the British, from Winston Churchill down, hoped so much and which they even looked upon as an alternative to a second front, has proved less effective than was expected. As to the exploits of the suicide patrols, they would be most valuable as a complement to an offensive or as part of a campaign of guerrilla warfare, but today it is clear that neither bombings nor raids will introduce irreparable disorder in Hitler's plans, finally snatching the initiative from him.

The clamor for a second front is not going to diminish; on the contrary, it will become overwhelming as soon as the stupendous struggle on the Russian front regains its former intensity. Until we see emerging from somewhere a force comparable with the Russian army in power to resist the totalitarian war machine, Russia will continue to polarize the hopes of all those who desire, above every other thing, to win the war. The psychology of the people has been transformed by the events of the last two years, and it will be useless for those who oppose support of Russia, or would prefer to see it reduced or conditioned, to try to stir the ashes of old apprehensions and antagonisms. In that field Hitler's speculation will fail even more completely than in the military field: if the plan to smash Russia in six months proved a ridiculous fantasy, the hope of politically isolating the Soviet Union reveals a still greater miscalculation. The time has passed when such slogans of defeat as "Better Hitler than Léon Blum" and "Better Hitler plus Franco than the Spanish reds" could deceive a people facing the Nazi threat. The

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person who today cries, "Better a stalemate or a negotiated peace than a Russian victory," only identifies himself as an irresponsible idiot or a traitor.

Those who doubt this should look at the British press of the last few months—not merely the *Daily Herald* or the *News Chronicle* or any other liberal or labor daily, but the great conservative press. The most recent attitude of that press can be expressed in some such phrase as this: "If only we win the war, we don't care who commands—Wavell or Timoshenko." Some of those who set down such brave words may not be as indifferent as they pretend. But for the majority of the British people, yes!

The demand for a second major front has been gaining not only in extent but in authority. At the beginning it was mainly a popular movement of sympathy for the stand of the Russian people, a movement from below, naturally encouraged by the Communists. The ordinary man, especially in England where the effects of the Russian resistance were more directly felt, asked feverishly at the beginning of the winter for a diversion which could save Leningrad and Moscow. The reserve with which that demand was met by the high command did not impress the man in the street. He had seen military experts go wrong in many crucial instances—to begin with, that of the Russian resistance itself—and he had seen the General Staff strike in places where an offensive extinguished itself as soon as it was started. Later, in the Riom trial, he followed the duel between Daladier and his generals, in which the former French Premier charged them with having pretended at various times that they lacked sufficient war material to undertake an action when in fact the stores were full of munitions and tanks which had not been sent to the front.

As time has passed, the demand for a second front has found more sophisticated support. Doubt of old strategic concepts has penetrated even the professional military ranks. Soldiers as well as common people begin to be irritated by the realization that each day brings its new defeat, and that one can hope for good news only in the Russian communiqué. The popular impression that if no change is made the Allies will lose the war is strengthened by the criticism of military men themselves, who can no longer refrain from speaking their minds even if the general staffs remain unconvinced. The excellent book by Lieutenant Colonel Kernan, "Defense Will Not Win the War," has rapidly become almost a classic of the new strategy; and there are many other officers of the army and the navy, in Great Britain as in the United States, who maintain the same position. And in the space of two weeks three so different authoritative voices as those of Mr. Litvinov, General Sikorsky, and Dr. V. K. Wellington Koo pronounced themselves in favor of the second front—while reports of the concentration of new German troops along the Russian frontier became more and more alarming. The demand has thus become the most vital issue in the clash of two strategic concepts, an issue on which depends the very outcome of the war.

The man in the street is the more convinced, now that he has authority to back his hopes and intuitions. He tells himself that when a statesman and commander like General Sikorsky, whom no European Dies committee has ever classified as red and who is a member of the Inter-Allied Council, asks for a second front, it must be for reasons good enough to outweigh the dangers. Neither can he imagine that the Soviet government, to which the other Allied governments may be assumed to have stressed the difficulties of a second front, would insist on it through its diplomatic representatives unless the Russian leaders believed in its practicability. And he assumes that those leaders must know as exactly about the problem of shipping, always put forward as the greatest obstacle to an invasion of Europe, as the officials who oppose them. For his part, the common man believes that if ships were found to carry more than 700,000 men safely to the Near East and to the Pacific, it should not be impossible to find the necessary tonnage for a much shorter expedition—for instance, to Portugal. And it is precisely through Portugal, and through that Spain which continues to be potentially at war with Hitler and with Franco, that the popular imagination, especially on the other side of the Atlantic, visualizes the irruption of the Allied forces into the occupied countries of Europe.

Naturally, considering the losses suffered by the British merchant marine and the far from completed American building program, we cannot hope to find enough ships to meet the demands of all the fronts. This must be admitted. But if the importance of striking in Europe in 1942 is recognized by the general staffs, they will accept the hard necessity of cutting off supplies from England and the Pacific for a few months. This would imply many sacrifices. Ships which now carry food to Great Britain, and ammunition and reinforcements to the Far East, would have to be devoted to preparing the great blow in Europe. The English would be obliged to eat less; but in Spain the people endured their hunger through almost three years of war, subsisting on a little bread and rice and even less fish. It would mean also that every one of the United Nations would stand ready to sacrifice its own immediate national interest to the common requirement of victory. It is only a matter of knowing how to choose.

If popular logic had prevailed over the sophisticated wisdom of statesmen, the world might have been spared this cataract of blood. The common man has always sensed the futility of expecting "preparations" to catch up with racing events. Today he asks himself whether, if such

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extreme difficulties in shipping exist in 1942, they may not still exist or be even more serious in 1943 and 1944. But a question he asks himself even more earnestly is what forces can take the place of the Russian army in the Battle of Europe that must finally bring about the defeat of the Axis if in the meantime Russia has been vanquished or eliminated as an effective factor in the war. It is not a question of idealizing the Russian army; not a question of suggesting that well-equipped and well-commanded British and Americans will not be capable of fighting as well as the Russians. But can anybody seriously think that a British-American expeditionary force, disembarking in 1943 or 1944 at the best imaginable point in Europe, could accomplish the job of an army trained in a life-and-death struggle with the Nazis, operating from its own soil with a whole nation behind it? Once the Russian army is destroyed, there will be no serious chance of opening a second front in Europe. On the other hand, with the Russian army at its full strength and with the United Nations throwing their entire weight into the battle, there is a chance not only of stopping the Axis drive but of breaking Hitler sooner than many people think possible. Under one condition: *that they strike this year and wherever it is possible to strike.* Because in my conception a second front does not mean a single second front. If it is practicable to strike at the same time through Portugal and Spain, along the French coast, and through Norway, so much the better. To open a second front means to utilize all the present resources of the United Nations at the moment when Hitler launches his next blow, to provoke a diversion and division of his forces, to give him hell from one corner of Europe to another.

Certainly the enterprise implies tremendous risks, but no risk could be greater than that involved in the collapse of the army that until now has proved the only one able to stop the Nazis. Should an expeditionary force, which need not be of millions, suffer a serious setback, it would not mean the end of the war any more than did the disaster of Dunkirk or the collapse of France or any of the major defeats in the Pacific. But the smashing of Russia, or even the conquest of the Baku oil fields, leaving the Red Army incapable of fighting a real war, would mean that Hitler had destroyed the Allies' chance to defeat him in Europe.

Of course in 1943 or in 1944 an Allied expeditionary force could be sent into action better equipped and better trained than would be possible today, and many more ships would then be available. Unhappily, while we build ships and equip and train our forces, the Axis will be doing the same thing. And even if the Allied preparations went ahead at greater speed, it is a serious question whether Britain and America together could within two or three years produce sufficient material to compensate for the loss of the Russian armies with all their equipment, and of Russia's great industrial plant.

In discussing the value of an Allied offensive, the growing unrest and hate against Nazism cannot be ignored. The opening of a second front—or of several new fronts—in Europe would demand the full unleashing of political warfare and a swift revision of the diplomacy of the democracies. However powerful it might be, an expeditionary force could be gravely weakened if it found itself hampered by the lack of a realistic policy toward the puppet regimes and the surviving neutrals. That applies equally in 1942 and 1944, and without regard to the place where an attack might be launched. An army of liberation should be able to move as necessity dictates unhampered by political compromises and diplomatic maneuvers. One cannot imagine such an army operating successfully in Western Europe if its leaders are forced to take care lest they injure the Nazi patriotism of General Franco or Chief of Government Laval. Effective action presupposes the ending of all the ambiguous situations which could otherwise be used by Hitler to tip the scales in his favor. On the other hand, a daring political offensive would assure formidable and delirious support for the expeditionary army from all the conquered peoples.

If a major Russian defeat would reduce to an incalculable degree the chances of Allied military victory, from a psychological point of view its effect would be no less catastrophic. The emotion with which the efforts of the Red Army have been followed during six months of general misfortune arises not only from admiration for Russian gallantry and competence. It has a deeper source: once more the peoples of the earth have seen an entire nation moving as a single man against terrible odds. The feeling that has crystallized around Russia is of the same sort that surrounded the Spanish epic and that would have gone out toward France if in June of 1940, instead of declaring Paris an open city, the government had given the people a chance to rise to their patriotic and revolutionary traditions. Many things have been said about the spirit of the Russians in this war, but nothing has better conveyed the difference between the temper of Russia and of other countries than the irritated tone in which Sir Stafford Cripps, addressing Parliament in his new capacity as Leader of the House, pronounced himself against "business as usual," "pleasure as usual." One felt that he had fresh before his eyes the vision of a country where the people were all in the front line, where nobody shrank from destroying the fruits of twenty years' effort, knowing that nothing was worth saving in case of a Hitler victory and that any price was worth paying to help bring his downfall.

It would mean tremendous disillusionment and despair for the peoples of the free and occupied nations if such a country and such an army were allowed to be

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destroyed without the greatest effort to keep them in the struggle. In this war, perhaps more than in any other, enthusiasm is war material as valuable as planes and tanks.

Often I have been told, "You talk about enthusiasm in war. How would you define it?" Very simply, by recalling one happening in the Spanish war. At a very difficult moment of the fight in Catalonia "El Campesino," the popular Loyalist commander and a real peasant himself, was sitting in the hall of a hotel in Barcelona waiting to be called to the War Office. People surrounded his table. "Is there any professor here?" asked El Campesino. There was a professor—of astronomy. "Astronomy?" said El Campesino. "Well, for this case it will do all right. Tell me, professor, is it the truth, as somebody in my brigade told me one day, that there was once in history a war of thirty years?" "Yes," replied the professor. "Are you sure?" and his eyes began to brighten. "Of course," replied the professor. And El Campesino, with a great burst of joy, cried, "Then we are saved!"

That is enthusiasm in war. That is what Russia has, what China has, what Spain had. But El Campesino was wrong, not in his spirit but in his calculations. Spain was not allowed thirty years in which to win, and neither are the United Nations. It will be 1942—or never.

Shall We Draft Women?

BY MAXWELL S. STEWART

IN THE United States, in sharp contrast to the situation in England, Russia, and China, the war has so far been predominantly a man's war. An enormous amount of feminine energy has gone into rolling bandages for the Red Cross, knitting sweaters, air-raid-precaution work, first-aid courses, and motor-corps-auxiliary activities; but all this, though of undoubted value, is on the periphery of the war effort. In coming months, if the war is to be won, American women will have to contribute a very large part of the additional effort demanded of us by total war. Unfortunately, few people, men or women—if we are to judge by press comments and ordinary conversation—have as yet any comprehension of the nature and extent of that effort. There is not even agreement on policy in high government circles.

Women will be needed in huge numbers in our war factories before the end of this year. Women will also have to take over such civilian jobs as running elevators, street cars, and buses and operating light machinery in order that men may be released for the army and for heavy work in the war industries. The situation confronting us, in a nutshell, is as follows: At the beginning of this year approximately 5,000,000 persons were employed in our war industries. By the end of the year, if we are to attain the production goals set by the President, at least 15,000,000 must be employed directly in war work. During the same period selective service is expected to take some 2,200,000 men out of industry and agriculture for our fighting forces. To meet the tremendous demands which the war has imposed upon us, it is estimated that 8,400,000 workers can be shifted from civilian to war jobs. Another 1,500,000 can be drawn from the ranks of the unemployed. The normal increase in population will provide half a million workers. A few tens of thousands of older men who had retired or were about to retire can be put back on the job. But most of the remaining 2,000,000 jobs will have to be filled by women—and by women who are not now working outside their homes.

So far women have not entered the factories or otherwise taken over war jobs to anything like the extent they did in 1918. Of the 5,000,000 persons employed in war industries at the beginning of this year, only about 500,000 were women. In World War I about 2,000,000 women were directly engaged in war work. In 1941 only 4 women in every 1,000 were working in war industries; in 1918 the ratio was 21 to 1,000. In view of the tremendous industrial requirements of total warfare today as compared with those of 1918, it is probable that before we are through we shall have to exceed the 1918 ratio by a considerable margin.

A glance at the 1940 census figures will show us how we can meet our crucial man-power problem by the employment of women. Of the 50,350,000 women fourteen years of age or over, slightly less than one-quarter, or 12,850,000, were listed as in labor force, and of these 10,700,000 were gainfully employed. About 28,500,000 women were engaged solely in their own housework, and another 4,500,000 were in school or college. A considerable number of the women who do their own housework are young women with employment experience. Many of them have no children; many others have children past the age when they require constant care. There are also many hundreds of thousands of young unmarried women who are perfectly able to work outside their homes but have never felt the necessity for doing so. A substantial proportion of these are highly

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trained college women who are capable of adjustment to many kinds of skilled work.

Perhaps half as many women as will be required this year are already registered in one or another of our public employment offices. The United States Employment Service is analyzing the work records of these women in an effort to find out how many of them are available for jobs in the war industries. But it is evident that at least a million, and probably many more, of this year's war jobs will have to be filled by women who are not now looking for work and have no intention of going into a war factory. Several additional millions will be needed next year.

How to get suitable women for the jobs that must be filled is one of the crucial questions before us today. Women have given unstintingly of their time for all kinds of volunteer activities. But there is a vast difference between contributing a few spare hours a week to voluntary defense activities and working in a factory day in and day out until the war has been won. And it is the grind of factory work, rather than the volunteer activities, that we must depend on for ultimate victory.

No one can say just what proportion of the needed women can be obtained by appeals for voluntary enlistment. Few authorities believe that enough qualified women workers can be obtained by this means. It is generally felt that in this war, as in the last, the chief motive force driving women into war work will be economic pressure. We might as well face facts. Practically all the women who are now working are doing so because of necessity. This is particularly true of the women in factories. Of the 2,000,000 women engaged in some form of war work in the last war, a few may have been motivated primarily by patriotism; the majority were forced into it to support themselves or their families. With nearly 5,000,000 men in the armed services, many women had no choice but to seek work. The rapid rise in living costs during the war also tended to drive women out of their homes and schoolrooms into factories or government offices.

The same forces are already operating in this war, but they have been counterbalanced to some extent by generally improved economic conditions. Despite increased taxes and higher living costs, most American families are better off today than they were during the 1930's. Although figures are lacking, there is evidence that a considerable number of women who took jobs during the depression have given them up during the last year or so because the pressures which drove them into the labor market have lifted. It is possible that the curtailment in the sale of automobiles and the restrictions on home building will also restrain some women from looking for work, for many married women, especially among the middle classes, appear to have held jobs in order "to keep up with the Joneses." Any effort to enrol married women for regular work in industry, moreover, is bound to strike a snag in the present draft-deferment procedure. It is natural, if not indicative of the highest patriotism, for a woman to hesitate to take a job if by working she increases the chances of her husband's being drafted. Some change in selective-service procedure is imperative if married women are to be drawn fully into the war effort.

Nevertheless, it can hardly be denied that the coming year will see considerably greater pressure on women to seek work. As the draft reaches out for married men, more and more women will be forced into employment. Up to now the cost of living has risen only about 15 per cent, but once inflation get under way, it proceeds at an increasing pace. Next year's taxes may be double or triple this year's, particularly for low-income families. If the proposed increases in social-security taxation, the suggested plan for deferring wages, or a sales tax is adopted, the pressure on low-income families will become very heavy. It is possible that it will produce the millions of women workers required.

Official Washington seems inclined to wait and see whether these voluntary workers suffice before considering a plan for conscripting women for war work. Many persons, however, believe that conscription is not



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only necessary but preferable to voluntary methods. No individual, they argue, can possibly say where he or she can serve best in the war; the decision should be left to an impartial board which, after reviewing the person's capacities and responsibilities, should have the perspective for a fair judgment.

The experience of England in mobilizing the labor of women is especially pertinent here. England's traditions and practices with regard to women working are perhaps closer to ours than those of any other country. Largely because of these traditions the British government procrastinated, even as ours has done, in instituting a system of labor conscription applicable to women. But when the country was finally organized for all-out production, it found that its acute shortage in man-power could only be relieved by the employment of women under governmental direction and compulsion.

Compulsion has been applied charily and with no great hardship. Compulsory registration of women began in April, 1941. Girls twenty and twenty-one years of age registered first, but by now all women and girls between sixteen and thirty have been enrolled. Most of the twenty- and twenty-one-year-olds have been called up for the Auxiliary Territorial Service, to do various types of war work. About 20,000 women between twenty-one and thirty-five years of age are being placed in war industries each week. Most of these are transferred, with or without a period of training, from civilian to essential war industries. In some munitions plants women already compose 80 to 90 per cent of the workers. Forty per cent of the employees of some of the aircraft factories are women, and the ratio is growing. While women are used chiefly for light operations requiring accuracy and manual dexterity, an increasing number are being used in heavy machine operations—with no dire results.

From the beginning the British exempted women with children under fourteen, together with the wives of men in active service, from duty outside their homes. But since the country now faces a serious shortage of workers, this policy may have to be revised. As a means of expanding the labor supply the government is now casting a rather envious eye at the large number of married women whose domestic responsibilities make it impossible for them to accept full-time jobs but who might be available for part-time work. Organizing part-time work presents a number of difficult problems, but the difficulties are not insurmountable. Where the experiment has been tried, satisfactory arrangements have been worked out.

Children, particularly children under school age, have offered the chief obstacle to enrolling an adequate number of full-time and part-time women workers in the British war industries. Like this country, Britain had few day nurseries available for working mothers. A number were opened to meet the emergency, but efforts in this direction were hampered by lack of trained personnel. Steps are just now being taken in Britain to train nurses and supervisors for nurseries that should have been ready many months ago. Young children of school age also present a problem because the schools usually open several hours after the women have to go to work and close before they get back.

Both British and American experience shows that women have special domestic responsibilities, not borne by men, which must be taken into account if we expect to enlist any large number of women workers. In addition to cooking, taking care of the house, and rearing the children, women usually do the shopping for the family. These duties must be considered in arranging working hours for women. A six-day week may be necessary for men in war industries, but it is not practical for women. In a recent study of the number of working hours advisable in war time made at Princeton University a forty-hour week was recommended as most satisfactory for full-time women workers. Efforts to lengthen this work week have been found greatly to increase absenteeism among working women. Special precautions must also be taken to provide proper safeguards for health and safety. In order to preserve morale, if for no other reason, wage rates, including the entrance rate, should be the same as for men.

It is impossible to set forth at this time a complete program for the use of woman-power in the war effort. Many of the essential decisions regarding the disposition of man-power have not yet been made. We still do not know whether we shall need an army of six or of ten million men. We have not yet reached a decision regarding the conscription and placement of non-military male labor. Until these questions of general policy are decided, the details of a program for women cannot very well be formulated. But since there is no doubt about the need for huge numbers of women workers, there can be no excuse for failing to take certain preliminary steps which will enable us to avoid some of the painful delays experienced in Britain.

First of all, it is necessary to set up training courses which will prepare women for specialized work in the war factories. A start has already been made in this direction. The defense-training programs conducted by vocational schools, the NYA, and the training-within-industry program of the Labor Division of the War Production Board are open to women as well as men. But comparatively little has been done to bring these programs to the attention of women, or to set up courses specially adapted to women.

Although formulation of a plan for conscripting women for the war industries may not be desirable until the need for such action is more apparent, an inventory

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of our resources in woman-power should undoubtedly be made. For technical reasons it may be advisable to do this gradually as it was done in Britain. But there is no logical argument against registering women just as we are now registering men.

Finally, provision of adequate nursery-school facilities for the children of the women who are being drawn into employment should be undertaken at once. No other single measure would do more to release trained young women for vital war jobs. Plans might also be worked out for a system of part-time employment which would enable thousands of women now barred from accepting jobs to render effective aid in the war effort. Only subservience to an outworn tradition and a disposition to play politics prevent us from taking these essential steps while there is yet time.

Laval and Roosevelt

BY LOUIS FISCHER

SUMNER WELLES declared at his press conference last week that he could not receive the French Ambassador's rejection of the State Department's note of April 13 because the Ambassador's communication had previously been submitted to the Nazi authorities for approval. How can we remain on friendly relations with Vichy when its relations with us are filtered through Berlin and dictated by Hitler?

Mr. Welles recently went to Rio de Janeiro and persuaded many Latin American governments to break off relations with the Axis powers because those relations helped the Axis and harmed us. But Vichy helps the Axis. It has turned over vital French territories to Japan. We blacklist foreign firms and foreign subsidiaries of American firms which trade with Axis countries. But Vichy has admittedly supplied Rommel's armies in Libya. Don't we need consistency in our foreign policy?

What practical advantage can further relations with Vichy give us? It has been contended that by maintaining the tie with the authorities in unoccupied France we prevented or restrained Hitler from seizing the French war fleet. Now the French navy is a tremendous asset; it could alter the balance of the war. How could we achieve the important end of keeping it out of Hitler's hands? Obviously the few boatloads of wheat and oil we have shipped to France and North Africa could not do this. If it is true that our friendship for Vichy keeps the French navy in disuse, then either that relationship must be worth so much to Hitler that he is ready to forgo the French fleet or our friendship so strengthens the Vichy authorities that they can stand up to Hitler and refuse to surrender the fleet.

As long as we are friends of Vichy we cannot take military action against Dakar or any other territory controlled by Vichy. That must be a relief to Hitler. But can this be the full reason for Hitler's remarkable restraint toward the French navy?

At the time of the armistice not a few French politicians wished to prolong resistance against Germany. They would have formed a government in Africa and used the French fleet to aid the British. Germany's seizure of the fleet would have fanned this opposition and might have provoked an open mutiny of the French commanders and sailors. Hitler, shrewdly recognizing that he must not try the impossible and hoping soon to knock out the British and end the war, therefore stipulated in the armistice agreement that the French navy was to gather in French ports, be demobilized under German and Italian control, and "lay up." He was afraid that it might somehow come into British hands or be used to establish nuclei of hostility to him in the French empire. Knowing that Marshal Pétain and General Weygand wished to keep the French colonies, Hitler provided in the armistice that units of the French navy might be "released to the French government for protection of French interests in its colonial empire."

These two motives still inspire Hitler: on the one hand, he fears that any attempt to grab the French fleet would enflame the French public and endanger the ships —they could be gutted or scuttled by their crews; on the other hand, he hopes that the Vichy French themselves may some day use the fleet against the United Nations. This is the clue to the reappointment of Pierre Laval.

Hitler will be busy during the coming season. He will fight hard in Russia. He may drive into the Near East and approach Syria. The Allies may invade France with commandos or larger concentrations. If the democracies win this war, that ends Laval's career. He therefore must help Hitler to win. Germany is pressed for time and man-power. It is in need of more active collaboration from France. Laval is the man of Hitler's tenth hour.

Hitler has a profound faith in Quislings. He does not regard any country as unalterably anti-German or anti-Nazi. Ever since June, 1940, he has been trying to forge a French government supine and disloyal enough to reenter the war, this time on the side of Germany. Then a French government, not the Axis, would use the French fleet against the enemies of Germany. To get France to

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fight for Germany after it had refused to fight for itself is a difficult and delicate task, and Hitler has handled it with much patience. Now he seems to think either that the time is ripe or that the task is hopeless. That is the meaning of the return of Laval.

What is America's duty in this Laval crisis? First, however, what was America's role in the French situation before this crisis? Pétain has assiduously cultivated United States friendship. Why? Because to Frenchmen America has become a symbol of opposition to Hitler. Whenever Pétain or Darlan was accused of being pro-German, he could reply: But we are on cordial terms with the United States. It is significant, in this connection, that Laval, the day the news came of his return to power, made a public statement courting America. The continuation of diplomatic relations with America would enable Laval to do his pro-Nazi work under a protective cloak marked: The United States Embassy in Vichy.

Pétain has used that cloak too. The question which President Roosevelt must now decide is whether he should let Laval continue to use it in the plain service of Hitler. The magic name of America apparently has a potent hold on French sentiment and French public opinion. Can it not be employed to embarrass Laval and Hitler instead of helping them? Pétain did enough for Germany. Laval, obviously, intends to do more. Otherwise he would not have replaced Pétain as chief of the French government. Should we lend him the name of America to do this? Or should President Roosevelt go on the radio and speak in French to the French people and tell them that Laval is Hitler and that America therefore is breaking off relations with Laval and the betrayers of France. If friendship with the United States is an asset to Vichy we can turn it against Vichy. Otherwise, some day, using the pretense of a British air or amphibian raid on French soil, Laval will officially put France into the war against us, and then it will be too late to throw our prestige and influence with the French public into the balance against Hitler. We can do it today, perhaps tomorrow. But we cannot do it when the French in both zones are more completely gagged than they are now.

Washington has believed that by buttressing Pétain it checked Hitler. But Pétain, after appointing Laval, has appealed to all Frenchmen to support Laval. And Laval has no known desire to check Hitler—on the contrary. If we continue to buttress Pétain we buttress Laval, and we aid Hitler while preparations go on apace to bring France into the war as a pro-Axis belligerent. When Pétain and Laval were at odds there might have been some little sense in dealing with Pétain. But collaboration between Pétain and Laval obviously means more French collaboration with the Nazis. How can the United States government be a partner to this? Since we presumably have some weight with the French public, we should turn to it as the only possible obstacle to Hitler-Laval-Pétain schemes. Just as Churchill once addressed the Italian people by radio, President Roosevelt should speak to the French nation over the heads of its Nazi-made rulers and urge them to refrain from going into the war on Germany's side and against America.

Before this year ends, American troops may invade France. Their success will depend on their weapons, training, and courage—but also on the reception they get from the French people. America must have a clean record toward France. It must not be recorded that we helped Laval sell out France to Hitler.

The Dismal Reich

BY ZACHARIAH SHUSTER

THE general impression one gets from reading the official Nazi press is that though the Germans have conquered Europe, they are depressed and sad, so sad that the Propaganda Ministry cannot cover it up. Even the reports of Germany's victories written by official war correspondents contain no note of triumph but are tinged rather with weariness and nostalgia. The following excerpt from a story printed in *Das Reich*, the official paper of the Propaganda Ministry, illustrates the prevalent tone of the reports from the eastern front.

> Where are the happy French towns, in whose cool cellars the dusty bottles awaited us? Where is the deserted house of the notary with the grandfather clock and the soft, wide beds and the clean linen in the closets? Where are even the chimneys of Poland, its breweries, its vodka distilleries? In the U. S. S. R. there are no gay districts, no bountiful cellars, no pianos, tablecloths, or bells. Brother, take your staff and drag through your day's wandering with your half-loaf of bread and your small tin of sausage.

A soldier serving as official correspondent wrote thus of the Russian campaign:

> Endless is this land and endless the sky, roads without end in an infinite waste. One village resembles the other, one city is like another, everywhere the same women and children standing silently at the roadside,

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> everywhere the same wells and courtyards. Who knows whether we are making progress? When the column gets off the road and marches over the fields, guided only by the compass, we feel like world wanderers tossed about in an ocean of land, seeking new shores. And even this aimless gazing on vast spaces is the privilege only of the men in the first vehicles. All those behind are covered with a cloud of dust. The whites of the eyes glare strangely from the dry, dust-covered faces, and the parched lips refrain from talk and laughter. The motors whir or sigh; the axles and wheels groan; the army marches ceaselessly to the battle thundering in the distance.

A sense of unconquerable Russian spaces, of a wide "ocean of land" with the shores far, far away, is expressed in almost all descriptions of Russia. One gets the impression that the Nazi soldiers behind the lines are infected with the apathy that is usually ascribed to the Russians. The writer just quoted mentions also the glorious victories that have been won despite the enemy's stubborn resistance, but in the background of his factual report lurks a sense of emotional helplessness which may in the long run be a strong factor in the disintegration of Nazi morale. The same report ends with, "Yes, endless is this country, endless is its sky, endless, however, is also the dark fate with which it is burdened."

An account of an evening spent by Nazi soldiers on the Russian battlefield, also printed in Dr. Goebbels's paper, is saturated with human but un-Nazi-like sentiment:

> The darkness hovers mercifully over the lonely huts and stables, and the eternal guard of stars spreads out over the heavens. We talk of wives, girls, and children: of the wives thoughtfully, of the girls boldly and hungrily, and of the children almost shyly. Pictures pass from hand to hand; letters are read aloud; and gradually we learn about each other, how it is at home and how one feels deep down in his heart. Nowhere else do men unloose their tongues as they do on the battlefield. Never afterward will one permit another to look so deeply into his innermost thoughts. . . . When a man has fallen, our thoughts wander back to his family, and for their sake we should like to call back the irrevocable. . . . After we have spoken of him sufficiently, silence descends, and with this silence he returns to our midst and shows his quiet face ennobled by death.

This emphasis on the dreariness and longing of the individual soldier submerged in a mighty and interminable conflict is characteristic of most of the recent war correspondence. Of course, there are stories of heroism, too. Much is written about conquered bridgeheads, occupied industrial centers, the soldiers' great endurance under the enemy's ceaseless and "bestial" fire. Yet even here one feels the same emotional undercurrent.

Back on the home front that wizard of propaganda, Dr. Goebbels, is often more revealing than he intends to be. He betrays how gaiety has vanished from German faces by appealing to his people to force artificial smiles for the sake of the heroes returning from battle. This appeal, published in *Das Reich,* was properly entitled, On Smiling in War Time. The author, Hans Joachim Kitzing, introduced his subject with the observation that when the soldier comes home on a short leave "there is a gleam in his eyes and a smile about his lips." And how is he received? What do the people at home tell him, and what is the expression on their faces? In Herr Kitzing's words:

> After the soldier has told his story, he is ready to listen. The people at home also have much to tell, even more, it appears, than the soldiers. It would be good if they also would smile while telling of air raids, of waiting in queues, of the shortage of one article or another that enriches life. In most cases, however, the narrators of these hardships are glum. Only the listening soldier smiles, because to him all this appears trivial compared to the events in which he has participated. . . . The soldier may be led to think that life at home consists only of a chain of deprivations. . . .

This admission by the mouthpiece of the Minister of Propaganda and Enlightenment is followed by a long exhortation on the value of smiling even against one's natural inclinations. "Life is serious and passing," Dr. Goebbels philosophizes, "but the smile remains forever."

The Propaganda Ministry naturally tries hard to counteract grumbling, criticism, and all kinds of hostile undercurrents, but in doing so it is compelled to unveil at least part of the real picture of present-day Germany. In a leading article in *Das Reich* Goebbels himself pleaded with the people to endure with greater equanimity the hardships imposed upon them. He said:

> This does not mean by any means that we cannot discuss among ourselves the vicissitudes of the time. Even occasional cursing and scolding are not considered a crime against the state. If a person complains about this or that or gives vent to his anger, his conduct is understandable in the light of the thousand unpleasant by-products of the war. But a little thought will bring even the most stupid ones around to the realization that the government is not always at fault. Although it can do many things it cannot make the weather. When the winter is terribly long, the potato sprouts come up later than usual. One may be impatient and do some scolding, but that will not cause the potatoes to grow faster. And the government does not smoke the cigarettes which we now constantly lack; the public smokes 25 per cent more than before the war, and our tobacco industry is simply incapable of keeping pace with the demand.

He then delivered a long tirade against the British, who, he said, were bent upon utilizing this situation to destroy German morale.

That there is grave anxiety among the mothers of

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Berlin about the fate of their evacuated children is clearly shown by an article in *Das Reich* written by a child specialist to convince the mothers of the capital that the high mortality of children in the evacuation camps is not due to conditions in the camps. From his article we learn that more than 130,000 children were evacuated from Berlin in the spring of 1941. The mortality rate among them, the learned doctor asserted, was lower than the statistical tables of previous years indicated for children at home. The mothers should therefore be grateful for the extra children kept alive in the camps and not grumble about the deaths.

Poetic reactions to the current world scene appear frequently in the Nazi press, many of them charged with melancholy. Here is a prose translation of a poem written on the eastern battle line and published in *Das Reich*. The poet is Gerhart Schumann.

> Also over this gray and dreary land sinks down a night. We have buried the dead, the dead of our battle. Among the dark crosses the cold guns stretch. Someone is silently looking for a comrade's hand. Strange, in the swamps and woods a horrible anguish crushes us. O blue hills of Swabia. O silvery Bodensee. The sky is empty as the earth. Has it not one star? . . . Two gleaming stars bend earnestly and fervently to me—your face, your sorrowful smile, your eyes, beloved.

The present mood of the conquering Germans is well summed up in an article that appeared in the Goebbels organ under the title *Die Deutsche Stimmung* (The German State of Mind):

> In this war the surface of the German soul does not reflect the great events taking place at the front. In this fact lies the great difference, as all older people say, between the present and the First World War. . . . Then there was really such a thing as a German *Stimmung*. A man of that time who returned to Germany now without knowledge of the fundamental changes which have taken place since would certainly be astonished. Hardly a sign would betray whether the High Command of the army had just published a scanty report or had announced a great victory. The burning feelings to which the times have accustomed us remain beneath the surface. Is there a lack of courage? Are we indifferent and fatalistic? The general reserve, the concealment of feelings, the absolutely matter-of-fact attitude to the war do not arise from any lack of inner sharing. They are a new form of steadfastness which has been developed by our generation.

This mystical "inner sharing" which the Nazi government accepts as a satisfactory explanation for the complete indifference to victories, the vanished smiles, and the endless apathy in which the master race finds itself after all its triumphs belongs to the vague terminology introduced by the Nazis into political life. But the language used cannot disguise the realities of life or the reaction of these realities upon the German people.

In the Wind

A RECENT INCIDENT at Fort Bragg in North Carolina throws an interesting sidelight on army race relations. Several hundred white troops were gathered to hear a lecture on venereal infection by a camp chaplain. The same lecture was scheduled to be delivered to a Negro contingent at a later hour. But shortly after the talk for whites had begun, an officer interrupted the meeting to announce that the Negroes had by some mistake arrived outside the hall. He said that the hall would hold both groups but that he personally objected to a mixed audience and that if one other soldier shared his sentiments, he would order the Negroes to await their turn. Not one soldier objected. The officer reluctantly admitted the Negroes but seated them at the rear with four empty rows to separate them from the whites.

SOME OBSERVERS of isolationist tactics believe that the Ford-Lindbergh collaboration at Willow Run may have more political significance than was at first apparent. An effort will be made, they say, to build Lindbergh up as the genius of assembly-line bomber production and to reinstate the ex-colonel as a patriot by having him ferry the first plane out of the new plant to one of the fighting fronts.

GOVERNOR TALMADGE of Georgia has announced that he is opposed to a bill now before Congress that would allow $300,000,000 of federal funds to be turned over to state educational institutions. "If federal funds were appropriated," he says, "you would have the problem of coeducation of the races immediately. And that's something Georgia don't stand for."

THE BOSTON *GLOBE'S* information department received and published a letter from a woman who sought advice on how she could get transportation to Germany. She explained that she was an American citizen who had married a German. Her husband and two sons had joined the Nazi army. She was convinced, she said, that she was on Hitler's side in "the war against communism and the Jews" and so she would appreciate any assistance that could be given to help her take part in it.

THE NEWSLETTER *City Reporter* has compiled statistics on the relative circulation of isolationist and pro-Administration newspapers in New York City. It estimates that the papers still publishing isolationist propaganda have a circulation more than three times as great as the others.

MERWIN K. HART, head of the New York State Economic Council, was reported in this column three weeks ago as one of the indorsers of the early Nazi propaganda pamphlet, "Communism in Germany." Mr. Hart did not sign that statement, but Archibald Stevenson, his attorney and the vice-president of the council, did.

[*We invite our readers to submit material for In the Wind —either clippings with source and date or stories that can be clearly authenticated. A prize of $5 will be awarded each month for the best item.*—EDITORS THE NATION.]

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BOOKS *and the* ARTS

War Poems

BY MARK VAN DOREN

The Single Hero

This man kept courage when the map of fear
Was continents, was paleness to the poles,
Was Jupiter milk white, was Venus burning.
The very stones lay liquid with despair,
And the firm earth was bottomless. This man

Could walk upon the water; nay, he stamped
Till the drops graveled, till a sound returned
Of pillars underheel, of granite growing.
This man, alone on seas, was not afraid.
So continents came back. So color widened:

Bands upon blankness. So the other men,
The millions, lifted feet and let them down;
And the soil held. So courage's cartographer,
Having his globe again, restored each mass,
Each meadow. And grasshoppers sang to him.

Total War

For the gray temples, for the slippered feet
That bounded such a life as, bent to grace,
Looks brittle now, looks breakable, the word
Nevertheless is shatter; the shocked face

Must fly on other errands, the pale shins
Must brown, must bruise themselves, and all that trunk
Be fragments; the cohesive thought be shrapnel
Peppering cold skies. The sands are sunk

That pedestaled our figure, that as one
Mock granite sounded echo to our soul;
Whose end is now this grit, these million grains
That star a blackened heaven, where no whole

Ever again may shape. Yet, gentlemen,
Be shivered. What was habit now is myth,
Is mumbling. Let it go. A huger form
Waits round the world: man still, and monolith.

Christmas, 1941

The millions at this solstice
Who cannot see the long,
The white days coming:
To them no song

Except the death of others,
By bullet or by ice,
In dark Malayan waters
Or where the North Sea mice

Eat hawsers, and a howling
Wind from pole to pole
Brings minute word of bleeding,
Of the surrendered soul;

Of agony that nothing
Is song enough to soothe
Except of million others
The strong death news.

The Doomsters

The difference they prophesy,
If utter, disappoints the fear;
Apprehension only starves,
Staring at too far a year:
Feeding upon too changed a woe
From any that time's children know.

If relative, a law decides:
From this to that, so many causes.
Whereupon the fear grows fat;
Then midway of its feasting pauses:
Recognition stales the fare
Sooner than panic can prepare.

Too strange, a blank; too known, a foe
Familiarity refuses.
Experience lies down with doom,
That sleeps again, as history uses.
The difference they weep and sing
Is nothing, or is everything.

Hollywood Paris

THE LAST TIME I SAW PARIS. By Elliot Paul. Random House. $2.75.

FOR eighteen years, on and off, Elliot Paul lived in a small hotel in the rue de la Huchette, went to his newspaper jobs in the Chicago *Tribune* and New York *Herald* offices, wrote his books (which number fourteen), got drunk (and according to his own accounts very happily and stupendously drunk), aroused sentiments of loyalty and affection in the hearts of the people among whom he lived, and learned to play the concertina—as brilliantly, incidentally, as I have ever heard it played. This book records the personal histories of the French people of that little street during the years the author knew them, supplemented by a sound—if rather sketchy—contemporaneous political history of France. It opens in the year 1923, and except for those relatively brief periods which the author spent in the United States and Spain, it takes the reader consecutively through to the spring of 1940, when the first Nazi tank units crossed the Pont St. Michel and entered the rue de la Huchette.

It is evident that Elliot Paul lived simply and with tenderness among the inhabitants of that little street, just as he lived—as his "Life and Death of a Spanish Town" bears

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ample witness—among the Spanish people in Spain. It is evident, too, that he was through choice a part of a Frenchman's, not an American's, Paris; by instinct he preferred the *bistrot du coin* to the Cafe de la Paix or even to the Dôme. Nor has he any particular interest in celebrities, as such. Only on page 392 does a short, hasty list appear in which the names of celebrities and nonentities are genially intermixed, and nowhere in the book—let it be set down to his everlasting credit—is there an anecdote about Joyce, Gertrude Stein, Picasso, or Ernest Hemingway. He refers to the surrealists as "a group of talented literary clowns," and calls André Breton "a windbag who could write like hell when he wanted to." For Elliot Paul's concern was not with art, or even with literature, but with the French people, their daily living and their daily argument.

In view of all this, it would seem that Paul's present book might very well contribute one chapter to a history which we badly need: that is, a personal record—over an almost twenty-year period—of a people who will never cease to be of profound and passionate interest to Americans. There is, indeed, no reason why this book should not have gone far toward divesting the French of their foreignness for those Americans to whom the quality of the French spirit is still unknown. There is no reason why such an essentially human document might not have served to reestablish not only Frenchmen's prejudices and peculiarities but the obvious fact of their inseparability from the rest of mankind.

This would be the veracious artist's first concern; it has, regrettably, not been Elliot Paul's. For all his indulgence of and his affection for the long cast of characters of whom he writes, he has viewed them with the canny eye of the *metteur en scène*. He has managed to serve them only as clever make-up man, and their true substance has nowhere been set down. He has accentuated the length of their mustaches, the shortness of their waists, played up their mannerisms, presented their purely human characteristics in such a way as to make them appear national eccentricities. We become acquainted with sixty or more French women and men in the pages of this book, and they are all very droll and recognizably "froggy" figures, rigged out, it might be, for the Hollywood conception of a typical little-street-in-Paris scene. They are so picturesque and so quaint that they end by being grotesque; and it follows without question that the suicides, the tragedies, the loves and deaths of freaks are without dignity, and their politics must seem as futile to us as their defeat. In short, Paul's knowledge of the French people is as superficial as his knowledge of their tongue.

Among the minor but persistent annoyances in the book are (1) the translation, possibly humorous in intent but none the less tiresome, of every French word or phrase—examples: *"numero* (number)," *"alors, toi?* (well, you?)," *"canaille* (rabble)," *"Vive la France!* (Long live France!)"; (2) the constant misstatements made for the sake of humor or to fit in with the uninitiated American's idea of what living conditions in France must be—examples: Frenchmen's complete ignorance of modern plumbing, Quaker Oats, and grapefruit, cocktails are so strange to them that they choke on the olive in the martini, Paris water is unfit for drinking (had Mr. Paul said that Paris water was not generally used for drinking, I think no one would have objected, but Paris is known to have the best drinking water of all the European capitals—with the possible exception of Vienna—and excellent drinking water it is); (3) the appalling errors in French grammar; (4) the continual references to pre-war France's state of decay. These last, proffered by Mr. Paul without amplification, seem to be scarcely a conclusion he arrived at during those pre-war years of observation of French behavior but repetition of a facile phrase which has become familiar to us all during the last year or two.

That Elliot Paul has failed to write either an interesting or an authentic book is not due to lack of affection on his part for the French of the rue de la Huchette or to lack of feeling for the French people's cause. It is due rather to his own tragic inability to write about people—and by this I mean any people—with the same unequivocal artlessness with which he apparently lives in their midst. The word tragic is not out of place here, for Paul's obviously great capacity for responding with warmth to the needs of mankind, his ability to arouse love and loyalty in others, and his instinct for the unfortunate, the exploited, and the suppressed are worthy of a less careless and touristic rendering.

KAY BOYLE

"The Republic" in Basic

THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO: A NEW VERSION FOUNDED ON BASIC ENGLISH. By I. A. Richards. W. W. Norton and Company. $2.50.

HOW TO READ A PAGE. By I. A. Richards. W. W. Norton and Company. $2.50.

BASIC English is like the Mona Lisa: any serious consideration of its merits is disturbed by the wish to forget both the weight of convention and the lure of rebellious dissent. It does not help one to make up one's mind about Basic English that this limited language is addressed to foreigners in the hope of making world communication easier. The question always remains whether any important understanding depends on the extent and difficulty of a vocabulary or on something else not so readily controlled.

In his new version of Plato's "Republic" Mr. Richards adopts the former hypothesis, without, however, adhering strictly to Basic English. He uses more verbs than the list allows and thus avoids the "noun plague" that characterizes Basic. As he told readers of *The Nation* in the issue of March 28, he wants to make Plato's debate on government accessible to the widest possible circle of readers—readers who he thinks are always alienated by the leisurely pace and full flourishes of the original and its translations. He has therefore cut, condensed, and retranslated with an eye to simplicity.

The result does not strike me as fulfilling his intention. Setting aside objections of detail, I am more than ever convinced by this new version that the ease with which a presumed lowbrow will take to a classic does not depend wholly or even mainly on forms of speech. It depends rather on the familiarity or unfamiliarity of the ideas and their sequence. A great popular writer—say, Dickens or Conan Doyle—can use big words and involved constructions and

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still be widely understood, because what these point to is relatively commonplace. A difficult writer—say, Henry James in "The Ambassadors"—can use short words and short sentences and still give the impression of complexity and obscurity, because his substance is new and strange. So with Plato, the way of arguing—I might even say the need of arguing—can hardly be made attractive to those who do not already feel some liking for the enterprise and are not willing to put some effort into following its course.

I agree, to be sure, with Mr. Richards's rule that we should translate the classics into our own contemporary speech and not into some artificial and would-be archaic idiom. In the preface of Samuel Butler's version of Homer the translator gave the definitive reasons for this choice. They are less pretentious reasons than those Mr. Richards gives in his introduction to "The Republic," for Mr. Richards's mind is aglow with pedagogical earnestness. He believes that we should all read Plato for the sake of democracy. It is not clear to me how Plato's Spartan regime with class barriers and intellectual censorship is going to help keep up our spirits; and on general principles I suspect the elevation of any single book to the rank of scripture. In any case, Plato does *not* contain all that matters in political theory. The Greeks have *not* said the last word on any subject, however much we may admire what they did say. The notion of the last word is nonsense, at least until after the Last Trump.

The same strained eagerness vitiates Mr. Richards's other publication, "How to Read a Page," which is meant to accompany the "Republic." By discussing the ambiguities of some hundred important words this manual intends to correct Professor Adler's "How to Read a Book" and to take precedence over Professor Buchanan's discipline of the Hundred Great Books. It does not in fact accomplish either of these tasks, being a hodge-podge of semantics, propaganda for Basic, literary criticism, political theory, and theology. Though written down in spots and offensively cute in others, the work bears little relation to the description given on the jacket, "A Course in Efficient Reading." It is itself extremely difficult to read, and at best it only establishes the fact that prose needs as much interpreting as poetry.

Mr. Richards's own prose is certainly in want of it. One would guess that the text had been dictated if this supposition did not entail the further one that Mr. Richards had no ear. How else account for a sentence like "This illustrates well a point in these notes of very great importance"? This is unfortunately a fair sample. On one page Mr. Richards preaches precision in the use of words; on another he argues that it is pedantry to insist on correct usage because context gives meaning to most uses and even misuses. In this theoretical contradiction Mr. Richards follows the practice of the imprecise. He is addicted to the usually meaningless connective "in terms of"; he will not distinguish between "specific" and "particular" any more than between "shall" and "will"; and his mismanagement of pronouns is such as frequently to obscure all meaning. Indeed, his book directs attention not so much to the value of semantics and Basic for good reading as to the still more elementary axiom that "easy writing makes damned hard reading." Correct emphasis, placement, rhythm, and inner relations—in short, the old problems of prose that pedants still worry about—do not occupy Mr. Richards sufficiently. He evades these difficulties in part by proposing a new set of seven distinct quotation marks composed of small letters, which he himself uses with a freedom that seems to say again: "Let the reader do the work." There would be much to add about the philosophic and social implications of Mr. Richards's present failure viewed in the light of worthy services previously rendered. But speaking of pedantry, who is this Francis of Verulam who supplies a number of mottoes to Mr. Richards's chapters? Isn't "Bacon" Basic? JACQUES BARZUN

Preparing for Peace

THE ROAD WE ARE TRAVELING, 1914-1942. By Stuart Chase. The Twentieth Century Fund. $1.

THE sedate Twentieth Century Fund has engaged Stuart Chase, the happy warrior of economics, to write a series of six very short books under the general title, "When the War Ends." Although the first of these, "The Road We Are Traveling," is offered as a complete book, it is difficult to view it as more than a prologue to the series. It is merely a quick, facile summation of past investigations and fairly common knowledge. The sources are largely secondary. Mr. Chase's great gifts as a phrase-maker and publicist are abundantly in evidence, but not, as yet, the part played by the Fund's excellent research facilities. Even if we give future volumes the benefit of doubt, it is clear that a publication plan requiring this volume to stand by itself was badly devised.

But the broad intentions of the program are excellent. As A. A. Berle's foreword says, defeatism about the peace is almost as dangerous as defeatism about the war. "When peace comes, it will be an opportunity to use our vastly increased plants and human resources to raise the standard of living of all of us, and a challenge to make a greater civilization." Too few people understand that war, except in isolated areas of devastation, may well be a period of capital accumulation.

But Mr. Chase's immediate attention is directed to the past. He spends 82 of his 106 pages examining the pattern of change and the basic trends that developed between 1914 and 1942. He shows us in a brilliant flash how the economic assumptions of 1914 grew out of a century of seemingly insatiable markets and limitless expansion; how "the first scientific war on the planet" forced men to devise the techniques and the machines for mass production; how scarcity was outstripped, and how men after the war had to find new assumptions on which to base their lives.

The huge new plant capacity had two immediate results: intensive high-pressure selling, and a gradual falling off of new investment. "Savings, instead of being invested, gathered in stagnant pools." This of course was the primary cause of the Great Depression. The New Deal was a stopgap, "with no considered philosophy behind it. . . ." Then came Hitler, the threat of war, and the starkest kind of military and economic realism. Gold did not matter any more, nor budgets. Citizens who in 1940 voted against Roosevelt in the belief that "you can't spend your way out

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of a depression" approved of $60 billion for war and saw the economy galvanized. Men came first and money second. "No nation in this dangerous world of 1942 is meekly going bankrupt because some textbooks say it ought to. . . . Well, who is going to pay for [the war]? It is being paid for right now with the physical and mental work of those who are producing and moving the goods." Suddenly people made the vital discovery: the more production, the more money. Chase reminds us that in the midst of the German arms drive two million new homes for workers were built, great highways constructed. "The essential point is that profits are no longer the spark plug of the economic system."

Mr. Chase sums up the trends of the period under eleven heads: the advance of technology; the halting curve of population; the closing of the frontier; the growing interdependence of specialized producers; unemployment; the decline in private investment opportunities; the decline of the free market; the growth of propaganda both in business and politics; mechanized warfare; increasing centralization in government; and the advance of autarchy. In the final section of the book he sketches very briefly some problems and some goals for America, but since the next volume in the series is entitled "Goals for America," we ought to suspend comment pending details.

Most of Mr. Chase's broad and vividly pictured panorama will be accepted by progressive analysts. The dubious points are the emphasis on population curves, which can be and may already have been reversed; a passing emphasis on "priorities unemployment," which has turned out to be pretty much of a spook; and a coy dallying with James Burnham's managerial thesis. Mr. Chase pretends to be greatly mystified about the kind of revolution that is now abroad in the world, and calls it "X." But elsewhere, in a succinct passage, he explains it quite clearly: the more complex the institutions of modern civilization become, and the more specialized the tasks of the individual, the greater the need for planning and coordination. This means only one thing: centralized authority, which is the price we pay for a rich and variegated society. The great question is only whether centralized authority can be firmly chained to democratic controls.

HAROLD STRAUSS

The Fateful Decade

TEN YEARS: THE WORLD ON THE WAY TO WAR, 1930-1940. By Dwight E. Lee. Houghton Mifflin Company. $3.75.

PROFESSOR LEE has written the first comprehensive one-volume account of the political and diplomatic events of the decade which began with the cessation of reparations in 1931 and ended with the German war upon the Soviet Union and the United States in 1941. The story is told here with great skill in presentation and integration, with careful attention to details, and with an interpretation that draws the right lessons. The book suffers somewhat from its too exclusively political character. It does not do justice to the underlying "ideological" conflict which alone can explain the tremendous character of the crisis. Thus Professor Lee compares Napoleon with Hitler, overlooking the funda-

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mental difference between the French Revolution, from which Napoleon sprang, and the fascist revolution which produced Hitler. Therefore it is not correct to say that "both men might have utilized the forces they had evoked to construct a better world for everybody." Napoleon could have done it; he would have done it if he had remained faithful to the revolution. Hitler could not have done it—because he remained faithful to the vision which animated and produced him. "Had Hitler had a broader vision than the outlook of a half-starved debater inspired by the false traditions of a narrowly nationalistic pan-Germanism, he might have used his power to make Germany a partner in a better world order," says Professor Lee. But then Hitler would not have been Hitler, and the background of the Nazi revolution would not have existed. It is the very essence of Hitler and Hitlerism that he did not and could not attempt any order based upon liberty and equality, the principles of the French Revolution. The German people accepted Hitlerism not so much because of external conditions as because of certain social and intellectual traditions existing in Germany; this, however, does not mean that there is anything in the German "race" which would not respond to modifications and changes in the social and intellectual atmosphere of Germany. Professor Lee seems to underestimate the fateful importance of the fascist *Weltanschauung* as represented today in Germany and Japan, where it reaches far beyond the political and economic fields.

Despite these flaws the book has great value as a reliable, intelligent, and well-written guide to the political and diplomatic events of the past ten years. It is centered upon Europe and especially upon Germany; it is more concerned with the acts of the great powers than with the lesser actors on the European stage; and it concentrates on foreign policy and international relations rather than on the social and psychological trends in what may be called domestic policy which are of importance in determining the foreign policy of countries and groups. The events of the period, however, are analyzed with detachment and great fairness, and facts are presented graphically in a vigorous style. The ultimate conclusions of the author are inescapable for any serious student of recent history:

> In the future there must be, in addition to a more careful consideration of everyone's rights, a far greater emphasis upon responsibilities in a world of disappearing frontiers and ever-speedier means of communication. If the United States seeks to hide behind the Atlantic and Pacific, it may well lose the Washington-Jefferson-Lincoln tradition. Instead of emphasis upon nationalistic division there must be education for unity which stresses the common heritage of man as a result of his age-long humanistic aspirations and ideas.

This is the very thing which the German National Socialists and the Japanese nationalists reject most emphatically. Here lies the very reason for the decisive and total character of the world crisis which grew through the fateful decade, the non-recognition of which made the present catastrophe inevitable.

HANS KOHN


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Naval Primer

SEA POWER IN CONFLICT. By Paul Schubert. Coward-McCann. $2.50.

IN "Sea Power in Conflict" Paul Schubert attempts two tasks. The first half of the book is devoted to an exposition of navies in general and the diverse elements which make up what the author terms the "new sea power." The remainder contains an account of the naval history of the present war.

In interpreting sea power to the lay reader Mr. Schubert has done a very fair piece of work. He gives a fine account of the development of naval science during the past quarter-century, pointing out the changes being brought into modern warfare by the airplane and submarine. His chapter on the German navy is notable for a penetrating analysis of German strategic thought. Descriptive chapters dealing with various types of warships are not so satisfactory, mainly because of an unaccountable failure to deal with naval planes, though plane carriers are adequately described.

The second half of the book is less valuable. In fact, Mr. Schubert's accounts of the sea war do not go much beyond official communiqués, and in at least one instance, his statement in connection with the Norwegian campaign that "the German navy lost from one-third to one-half of its fighting strength," he merely repeats an early erroneous impression instead of taking the slight trouble needed to get the correct facts. However, despite such shortcomings "Sea Power in Conflict" is a satisfactory primer of naval information.

DONALD W. MITCHELL

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Power and Politics

PEACE BY POWER. By Lionel Gelber. Oxford University Press. $1.50.

THIS "plain man's guide to the key issues of the war and the post-war world" is so lucid that the plain man would undoubtedly profit from reading it, but it is also profound enough to engage the attention of the experts. It belongs to the realistic school of political thought. Its author declares:

> The issue to be determined is where power will reside. For too much has been written about the so-called "game of power politics" as though it were a sport, however solemn or diabolical, outside the legitimate business of society; one in which miscreants of the old school indulged and which artificers of the new school will abolish. In point of fact the contest of power is the essence of politics, and it is singular that the very ones who are confident that it can be uprooted from international relations are themselves eager to seize its fruits in domestic affairs.

Mr. Gelber presents his analysis of world politics persuasively and urbanely. Those who hope that the post-war world will achieve forms of unity and integration totally different from anything previously known in world history would do well to read this book. Yet the author is remarkably complacent about the economic and international difficulties of the democratic world and rather simple in his conception of the German malady and its cure.

The weaknesses of this book suggest that there might well be a greater exchange of thought between the realists, who understand the perennial problems of politics on any level of human history, and the radicals, who appreciate the unique and revolutionary aspects of particular periods of history.

REINHOLD NIEBUHR

Romains in America

SALSETTE DISCOVERS AMERICA. By Jules Romains. Translated by Lewis Galantière. Alfred A. Knopf. $2.50.

YOU might think that his experience with "The Seven Mysteries of Europe" would have taught Jules Romains the danger of writing about himself. Yet in this new extra-curricular divertissement, written in the intervals of leisure which even "Men of Good Will" leaves to its indefatigable author, we have but two important characters, one of whom is named Jules Romains while the other is no more than a manifest *alter ego*. As the naive Salsette goes about discovering America, the well-nigh omniscient Romains is always at his elbow to draw him out, to prod him into stronger affirmations of opinion, and to develop, if need be, his thoughts. Those familiar with "Men of Good Will" cannot fail to recognize Jerphanion and Jallez projected into middle age. And anyone who has ever studied a modern foreign language will recognize the familiar device of the two friends who travel about France or Germany or Mexico, as the case may be, in the pages of the second-year reader and composition book.

With the exception of the three or four pages on the American middle ages, the banality of Salsette's and Romains's remarks about our women, our cooking, our architecture, our landscape, our subways and parkways is disheartening. Where is the satiric talent of the earlier Romains, the man who wrote the comedies "Knock" and "Musse" and the novel translated here as "The Boys in the Back Room"? Aiming to be ingratiating, Jules Romains has written for his American hosts a bread-and-butter book.

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Keep Them Out!

NO event in 1942 is likely to have more effect on the future conduct of the war than this fall's Congressional elections. Although the majority of Congress supports the Administration's war program, a dangerous opposition is working overtime to capture Congress in November—or at least to elect enough defeatists and obstructionists to hamstring the majority.

The Nation herewith announces the early publication of a series of articles about several of these candidates—documented reports that will reveal a great many new facts as well as their voting records, affiliations, and public utterances:

C. Wayland Brooks (R., Ill.)
Stephen A. Day (R., Ill.)
Hamilton Fish (R., N. Y.)
Robert F. Rich (R., Penna.)
Gerald L. K. Smith (Mich.)
Jacob Thorkelson (R., Mont.)
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These are men about whom all good defenders of democracy must say—

Keep Them Out!

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IN BRIEF

BEND IN THE RIVER. By Jan Valtin. Alliance Book Corporation. $2.

A collection of minor stories and sketches many of which were first printed in the San Quentin *Bulletin* when the well-known author of "Out of the Night" was a prisoner. These stories, dealing mostly with sailors, convicts, abandoned women, hard-living men, reveal an acute sense of man's loneliness, man's cruelty, man's search for something greater than himself, but they are obviously early works, sometimes fumblingly brutal, sometimes over-pretentious, though indicative of a dormant talent. Many are prefaced by autobiographical sketches which tell of the author's fears, pride, and ambitions, and thus give some cohesiveness to the scattered tales.

BINDWEED. By Betty de Sherbinin. William Morrow and Company. $2.50.

The author is a young woman of twenty-five who has lived a good part of her life in Argentina. This, her second novel with an Argentine setting, is a pleasant, though uninspired, book about the life of almost-high society in Buenos Aires, wholly preoccupied with marital and financial affairs. The people are never very interesting, but Miss de Sherbinin has succeeded admirably in capturing the strong Catholicism, traditionalism, and isolation of the Argentine ruling class that are responsible, at least in part, for the behavior of our not-so-good neighbors.

DON PEDRO AND THE DEVIL. By Edgar Maas. The Bobbs-Merrill Company. $3.

A big historical novel about a young Spanish don who captures Peru with the Pizarro brothers and is in on everything, from the strangling of the Inca to the Spanish king's councils of state. The "devil" of the title seems to be totalitarianism and autocracy, but it comes out pretty cloudy. Worth reading for the historical detail.

DIE HELLEN NAECHTE: GEDICHTE AUS FRANKREICH. By Hans Sahl. Barthold Fles Verlag. $1.50.

Well turned verse this is, in that genre of simplicity perfected by German poets of the nineteenth century. But by now it is almost impossible to write straightforwardly in this convention, with its folk wistfulness and obvious, inevitable rhythms, without sinking into the conventional. In Mr. Sahl's poetic journal of exile the disasters of the last eight years take on the inexplicable, wanton character that historical events might have in the mind of a peasant—and his poetry suffers for it, because he is not a peasant. And yet he is not a modern poet, even though he may have been influenced by Brecht and other contemporaries. Where Mr. Sahl's poetry is strong it has the strength of an ultimate confession, as in the poem Spanien (1939), but elsewhere, for all its grace, it is hardly more than a melancholy, superior kind of occasional verse.

PATTERN OF MEXICO. By Clifford Gessler. Illustrated by E. H. Suydam. D. Appleton–Century Company. $5.

The chapter headings and the thirty-two full-page pencil sketches, well reproduced and expressive of an old-fashioned charm, by the late E. H. Suydam give this handsome volume its principal distinction. The chief value of the text is that it is a conscientiously complete treatment of a perennially fascinating subject. The approach is that of a conventional travel book, superficial and at times banal.

RECENTLY PUBLISHED

Ramparts of the Pacific. By Hallett Abend. Doubleday, Doran. $3.50.

Brothers of Doom: The Story of the Pizarros of Peru. By Hoffman Birney. Putnam's. $3.

Victory Through Air Power. By Major Alexander P. de Seversky. Simon and Schuster. $2.50.

Heroes I Have Known: Twelve Who Lived Great Lives. By Max Eastman. Simon and Schuster. $3.

Foreign Devil: An American Kim in Modern Asia. By Gordon Enders. Simon and Schuster. $3.

How to Make Historic American Costumes. By Mary Evans. Barnes. $3.

Virgin Spain: The Drama of a Great People. By Waldo Frank. Duell, Sloan, and Pearce. New Edition. $3.50.

A Witness Tree. By Robert Frost. Holt. $2.

Lafayette and the Close of the American Revolution. By Louis Gottschalk. University of Chicago. $4.50.

What the Citizen Should Know About the Air Forces. By Lieutenant Colonel Harold E. Hartney. Norton. $2.50.

Russia and Japan. By Maurice Hindus. Doubleday, Doran. $2.

In the Nature of Materials: The Buildings of Frank Lloyd Wright. By Henry-Russell Hitchcock. Duell, Sloan, and Pearce. $5.

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

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A Friend in Court. By Judge Camille Kelley. Dodd, Mead. $3.

On Being an Architect. By William Lescaze. Putnam's. $3.

Memoirs of the Life and Peregrinations of the Florentine Philip Mazzei, 1730-1816. Columbia. $4.

What the Citizen Should Know About Modern War. By Fletcher Pratt. Norton. $2.50.

The Gift of Tongues. By Margaret Schlauch. Modern Age. $3.50.

Walter Rauschenbusch. By Dores Robinson Sharpe. Macmillan. $2.75.

I Was in Hell with Niemoeller. By Leo Stein. Fleming Revell. $2.50.

Destination Chungking. By Han Suyin. Little, Brown. $3.

Thomas Jefferson: World Citizen. By Senator Elbert D. Thomas. Modern Age. $2.75.

What the Citizen Should Know About the Army Engineers. By Lieutenant Colonel Paul W. Thompson. Norton. $2.50.

Needle to the North: The Story of an Expedition to Ungava and the Belcher Islands. By Arthur C. Twomey in Collaboration with Nigel Herrick. Houghton Mifflin. $3.50.

The Old South: The Founding of American Civilization. By Thomas Jefferson Wertenbaker. Scribner's. $3.50.

Moscow War Diary. By Alexander Werth. Knopf. $3.

New Poems, 1942: An Anthology of British and American Verse. Edited by Oscar Williams. Peter Pauper Press. $3.

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

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MUSIC

THE Spring "Season of Ballet" opened with a week of performances by the Ballet Theater. In addition to the repertory of the winter season there were two new ballets—Antony Tudor's long promised "Pillar of Fire," to the music of Schönberg's "Verlärte Nacht," with settings and costumes by Jo Mielziner; and Fokine's "Russian Soldier," to the music of Prokofiev's "Lieutenant Kije" Suite, with scenery and costumes by Doboujinsky.

Tudor's vocabulary is distinctive, effective, moving; it is also limited, both qualitatively and quantitatively, and hence repetitious and not equally suitable to all ideas, situations, emotions, or to all styles of music. The suppressed intensities and agonies of "Lilac Garden," the nostalgic music of Chausson's "Poème" provided the occasion of its one successful use; and equally successful now in the first part of "Pillar of Fire" are the same movements, intensified in accordance with the greater intensity of the scenario, which is concerned not with the recollection of an early love affair but with the actual—and violent—sexual experience; and in accordance also with the greater intensity and weight of Schönberg's music, which turns out to serve extremely well the purpose it was not intended for. And the effectiveness of this part is heightened by Mielziner's setting, with the violent distortion of its House Opposite. But in the second scene the music persists with endless aimlessness, the Tudor patterns of movement continue with feeble pointlessness, and Mielziner's setting constitutes in itself a devastating comment on both. The piece, it remains to add, was excellently performed by Hugh Laing, Nora Kaye, and the others.

As for "Russian Soldier," concerned with the "memories of his native land [that] crowd his mind as he lies on the vast battlefield" mortally wounded, not only does it use satirical music which is inappropriate to its serious idea, but it carries out this idea with invention which is even poorer than the music—the only good part being the peasant dances near the end and the few movements with which the soldier echoes them.

By the evidence of the Scythian Suite, which Koussevitzky performed in New York on March 12, Prokofiev wrote better music under the czarist regime that he satirizes in "Kije." In "Kije" technical expertness is grinding it out by formula; in the Scythian Suite a youthful fulness of imagination and of musical powers produces some pages that fall short of the mark and others that hit it with magnificent success. In this music about pagan Scythia I heard things which suggested the possibility that Prokofiev in 1914 had heard or knew the music about pagan Russia that Stravinsky had completed the year before. These things, however, if they did represent an external influence, were made part of a personal and individual way of writing; whereas what struck me more forcibly as I listened was the fact that a lot of Shostakovitch is a pretentiously expansive and diffuse reworking of the compact and sharply defined writing of Prokofiev.

Koussevitzky's stunning performance of this Prokofiev piece represented his complete understanding of it; but while the fabulously beautiful sound and finish of the Boston Symphony's playing in Mozart's Symphony K. 551 (the so-called "Jupiter") provided evidence of Koussevitzky's virtuosity as a conductor, his insufficient understanding of the music was made clear in the excessively fast tempo that robbed the first movement of its majesty and force, the distention of the *Andante cantabile* second movement into a *Largo,* the phrasing that avoided the plastic distortion which Koussevitzky is often guilty of but that was a mere playing of the notes with fabulous beauty of sound and finish, as against the sharply contoured inflection with which Beecham gives Mozart's phrases character and meaning. It was interesting to hear this performance, with its striking contrast to Beecham's spaciously elaborating and deeply probing treatment of Mozart, after reading statements about Koussevitzky's copying of Beecham performances—almost as interesting as it had been to hear the striking contrast between the alleged Koussevitzky copies and the alleged Beecham originals. Try to imagine a conductor listening to another conductor's performance and wanting to do anything but show what a different and superior performance *he* can give; better still, try listening to the Koussevitzky and Beecham performances of K. 338 on records.

B. H. HAGGIN

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Letters to the Editors

What's Wrong with Bates

Dear Sirs: While the writer of this letter makes no pretense of being a military strategist, he cannot refrain from taking issue with the military analysis of Ralph Bates in his What's Right with Britain, published in *The Nation* of April 4.

Assuming Mr. Bates's statistics to be correct, Germany has a maximum of 50 divisions available to meet an attack in Western Europe. England has at home 100 well-equipped divisions, plus 30 less well equipped, plus a "well-trained Home Guard of two million men." The major part of these forces must remain idle, according to Mr. Bates, partly because England does not possess enough shipping to transport them across the Channel.

Mr. Bates figures that because 7½ tons of shipping per man were necessary to maintain the A. E. F. in France (3,000 miles), 2½ tons per man will be necessary for the Channel (20 to 100 miles), and that England cannot spare this amount. This tonnage ratio is obviously incorrect, and, moreover, small boats, of which England has enormous numbers, could be used for the Channel crossing, as they were at Dunkirk.

Mr. Bates believes that the 130 divisions in England, in addition to the Home Guard, must remain there for home protection. Just where Germany is to obtain the 2½ tons of shipping per man to enable it to engage these home forces with its 50 free divisions he does not reveal.

Instead of using the British army for the purpose of attack on the Continent —with American reinforcements—Mr. Bates recommends that additional forces be sent to Libya and Suez, 12,000 miles distant by sea from Great Britain, to engage German troops who can be supplied by a route one-tenth as long. Certainly Britain must have strong air superiority over the Channel in order to protect a crossing, but when will it ever have it if not while most of Germany's strength is engaged on the Russian and Libyan fronts?

To the layman, the direct defense of Egypt, Suez, and the Near East looks much more difficult than a strong offensive in the West, which would also constitute an effective protection for the Near East. While an attack in the West may not, indeed, be feasible at this time, Mr. Bates's figures tend to indicate the contrary.

There is a growing feeling that if America and Britain spread their forces in an attempt to protect the greater part of the globe, they are likely to be defeated by enemies who do not hesitate to concentrate on our vital sectors, unhampered by attacks on their home ground. C. FAYETTE TAYLOR

Cambridge, Mass., April 15

Or Is He Right?

Dear Sirs: May I put in a word of warm praise for Ralph Bates's What's Right with Britain in your issue of April 4? It is, to my knowledge, the first article to insist that invading troops must be carried across water by ships rather than by inspiration, and that morale, for all its importance, is not the essence of a bridgehead. Through the whole article runs a nice combination of cold fact and progressive suggestion—the only combination that can have both a steadying and a stimulating effect on today's harassed reader. NIGEL DENNIS

New York, April 13

On Freedom of Expression

Dear Sirs: Your comment on my letter in the issue of April 11 raises questions which obviously require reply. You ask whether I do not know an "out-and-out fascist paper" when I see one. I know of no test of opinion to fit such a large word. What is loosely called the fascist press ranges from sympathizers with the Axis to the anti-British Irish, professional anti-Semites, the anti-New Dealers, and the anti-Communists.

You yourself reveal confusion when you classify Pelley, Deatherage, and Coughlin as the fascist press and yet speak of McCormick, Hearst, and Patterson as "more dangerous"—advocating that when they "skid across the thin line that divides their doctrine from open treason" they too should be prosecuted. I challenge *The Nation* to show any substantial difference in the editorial attitudes of all these papers. You cannot define the thin line. Your policy would result in suppressing them all.

All judgments in this field are subjective. That is always the danger in prosecutions for opinion. Benjamin Franklin answered your argument during the Revolution. Said he: "Of course the abuses of free speech should be suppressed, but to whom dare you entrust the power of doing it?" He was surrounded by Tory propaganda, which was not suppressed. Nor did the United States in the World War, shameful as the record of suppression was, dream of going to the lengths you advocate. The anti-British and somewhat pro-German Irish press was not touched; nor were most of the German-language papers, whose pro-Germanism was ill-concealed.

You ask whether the Civil Liberties Union is planning to "defend Pelley, Coughlin, and company." They have not yet been indicted. If they are indicted solely for opinions which present no "clear and present danger" of illegal acts, we shall of course offer to assist in defending them, as we have in the past defended equally unpopular spokesmen of causes which every liberal must detest. It is not particular individuals we defend so much as the Bill of Rights for all of us. In the War cases the Supreme Court laid down the rule of "clear and present danger," the best working yardstick yet devised. We propose to stand by it. We can only hope that *The Nation* too will adopt it instead of the dangerous doctrine of tendency. ROGER N. BALDWIN

New York, April 16

Dear Sirs: As one who turns with enthusiasm to Freda Kirchwey's articles, I must admit a first reaction of disappointment in reading her Curb the Fascist Press! in the March 28 issue. I feared that the weapon she threw at the fascist press might in time rebound to curb *The Nation.* I can hardly think of a worse calamity for American liberalism.

Liberalism could never have been in a worse quandary than it is today on this question of freedom of expression. Voltaire's famous saying is being severely tested. Can we still hold to that motto? Yes, if we admit just one exception: we must not permit anyone to use freedom of expression to further or to establish a regime the chief tenet of which is to suppress freedom of expression everywhere. LORNA C. GLOVER

Hyannis, Mass., April 10

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Sprung Rhythm

Dear Sirs: I admire George Barker for pulling no punches in his review of my book on Robert Bridges in your April 4 issue. And I should scarcely want Bridges's poetry or my criticism to fare differently at the hands of one who considers Shakespeare "unsound, turgid, and incomplete." From his remarks I judge Mr. Barker to be a forthright admirer of the English university wits, for whom "A Hope for Poetry" and "New Bearings in English Poetry" are crucial critical documents. Between this energetic and currently fashionable school and my own unfashionable traditionalism lies a gulf which a brief letter can hardly hope to cross. However, Mr. Barker makes two assertions which I feel bound to answer.

1. Mr. Barker accuses me of adducing "against" what he calls a "minor masterpiece" of Housman, Bridges's lyric "The hill pines were sighing." I do nothing of the kind. After noting that Bridges is sometimes facile and obvious in the Housman manner, I criticize "The hill pines were sighing" for its unmotivated intensity. I do not compare it with Housman's poem.

2. Mr. Barker concludes that I have "omitted to read any poetry published since 1930." I see no reason to furnish Mr. Barker with a reading list or a bibliography of my reviews, but if he wishes to pay the established Harvard tuition fees I shall be glad to read some contemporary poetry with him.

The basis for Mr. Barker's conclusion —my statement that no subsequent poet has been able to make a "similar use" of Hopkins's "wrenched form" of sprung rhythm—is worth discussing. Mr. Barker points to "the number of poets who have employed sprung rhythm" since 1930 as a proof of my omissions. My main point was that a very cautious use of sprung rhythm as a means of metrical variation—such a cautious use as one finds in Wyatt, Jonson, and Bridges—is more valuable as a permanent influence than the extreme violence of Hopkins's meters, in which sprung rhythm is used as a metrical norm. I should be the first to agree that not only the poets of the thirties but many earlier poets use occasional sprung rhythm. But the question is whether Hopkins's own meters have been successfully imitated.

The common mistake is to narrow Hopkins's general and wide influence on the language of recent poets to a metrical influence. Thus crammed imagery, startling ellipsis, and a general tightness and nervousness of line are often described as "Hopkins's sprung rhythm." The illusion is strengthened where diction is actually borrowed:

> Me, March, you do with your movements master and rock
> With wing-whirl, whale-wallow, silent budding of cells . . .

These lines of W. H. Auden's, which illustrate what C. Day Lewis calls "maldigested influence," certainly have the Hopkins flavor. But they are neither Hopkins's sprung rhythm nor anyone else's. If variation in degree of accent is recognized, both lines are iambic hexameter, with the third, fourth, and fifth feet inverted. If the lines are sprung rhythm, half of Meredith and nine-tenths of Browning are sprung rhythm.

What in fact one finds in Auden and many of his contemporaries is a sporadic use of sprung feet or sprung lines as variations on an accentual-syllabic norm. This is also Bridges's practice. But what one almost never finds is sprung rhythm used as a constant prosodial basis, as in Hopkins. Recent poets, who never attain Hopkins's breathless rush of sound, normally compensate for accentual gain or syllabic loss somewhere else in the line or in an adjoining line. Thus their experiments appear to me healthily tame. The sprung feet in the following examples are italicized:

> Rest from loving and be living.
> Fallen is fallen past retrieving
> The unique flier dawn's *dove*
> Arrowing down feathered with fire.
> (C. Day Lewis)

> One unnoted, mild and young; his *eyes* live in a dream (Spender)

> A turning page of shine and sound, the day's *maze* (MacNeice)

> Where we went in the black hull no light *moved*
> But a *gull* white-winged along the feckless wave. . . . (Tate)

The ambiguity of the last example is typical; there is no syllabic loss and the accentual gain might be questioned. Though the ruggedness of Dylan Thomas's diction sometimes gives an impression of sprung rhythm, Hart Crane alone among modern poets attained some of Hopkins's peculiar effects. But his verse was not technically sprung rhythm, and some of his most Hopkinsesque lines were written before Mr. Winters introduced Crane to Hopkins's poetry.

Mr. Barker will no doubt accuse me of further pedantry in thus insisting on a strict definition of Hopkins's sprung rhythm. But those who speak so blandly of sprung rhythm and of Hopkins's influence would do well to recognize the precise meaning of the term and to examine in what that very wide influence consists. ALBERT GUERARD, JR.

Cambridge, Mass., April 17

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